Payne v. Tennessee: A Stunning IPSE Dixit by Vitiello, Michael
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 8
Issue 1 Symposium on Capital Punishment Article 3
1-1-2012
Payne v. Tennessee: A Stunning IPSE Dixit
Michael Vitiello
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Vitiello, Payne v. Tennessee: A Stunning IPSE Dixit, 8 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 165 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol8/iss1/3
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE: A "STUNNING IPSE DIXIT"
MICHAEL VITIELLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a defense attorney inviting a jury to consider that a
homicide victim was an unemployed homeless person or a prosti-
tute or a homosexual or an AIDS victim and that the decedent's
human value was diminished, lessening the harm caused to soci-
ety by that person's death.1 Or imagine defense counsel arguing
that the decedent was elderly with a short life expectancy.2 Or
assume for a moment that Bernard Goetz killed his victims,
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1. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 833 P.2d 561 (Ca. 1992) (defendant targeted
prostitutes); People v. Sully, 812 P.2d 163 (Ca. 1991) (defendant targeted
prostitutes); People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. 1984) (defendant targeted
homosexuals); State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308 (Or. 1992) (defendant targeted
prostitutes); Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact
Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1621, 1652 n.233;
Evelyn Nieves, Easy Prey for a Violent Criminal; Prostitutes View Murder as Just One
Occupational Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1993, at A23 (Joel Rifkin confessed to
murdering 17 prostitutes); Ben Fenton & Neil Darbyshire, Serial Killer "Will Strike
Each Week, 'LONDON DALv TELEGRAPH, June 17, 1993, at 1 (murderer targeting
and strangling homosexual men); Stephanie Nolen, Rights Activists Ask Police to
Start Hate-Crimes Unit, MoNTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 5, 1992, at A3 (neo-Nazi youths
targeting homosexual); Michael Granberry, Warning Issued to San Diego Gays
After Three Balboa Park Murders, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1988, at A29 (murderer
targeting homosexuals); Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of Two
Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1988, at A8; L.A. Seeking "Executioner," L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1986, at A6 (murderer targeting lone transients).
2. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985) (guardian of
incompetent nursing home patient sought permission to remove nasogastric
feeding tube from the patient, an 84-year-old bedridden woman, with, among
other things, a limited life expectancy). See also wrongful death actions, in
which the life expectancy of the decedent is argued when damages are
awarded: Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Robinson, 263 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972) (calculated decedent's life expectancy to determine damages to
be awarded, based on her contribution to the family); Robards v. American
Auto. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 44 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (decedent's life expectancy
calculated in order to determine damage award based on his contribution to
family).
See also THE COMMERCAL APPEAL, May 26, 1985, at El, which tells of the
ordeal surrounding Karen Ann Quinlan when her life was being sustained on a
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instead of wounding them. Now during the sentencing phase,
imagine defense counsel arguing that his victims were gangsters,
uneducated thugs, who made their living by petty crime.
3
Counsel's conduct would appear outrageous. Would the law
allow an open appeal to the victims' lesser personal worth as a
reason not to impose the death penalty? In a variety of settings,
defense attorneys put victims of crime on trial.4 In some settings,
the evidence is highly probative, as in cases of self defense or
provocation.5 But the appeal to lesser human worth, inviting an
life support system. While on this system, she was kept behind a locked metal
door because people threatened to pull her feeding tube.
3. Goetz's attorney, Barry Slotnick, did make such an argument in his
opening statement. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE 102 (1988).
The key difference is that under fairly narrow circumstances, see discussion infra
notes 393-97, the victim's character may be relevant, but only when the
defendant is aware of the relevant character trait. The most obvious example is
a defendant's use of his victim's reputation for violence in cases of self-defense.
See, e.g., Dubose v. State, 369 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (evidence of
murder victim's alleged prior assaults on defendant was admissible to show
reasonableness of defendant's belief that victim was reaching for weapon when
he placed hand in back pants pocket); State v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079 (R.I.
1981) (defendant who asserted self-defense claim entitled to adduce relevant
evidence of specific act of violence perpetrated by victim against third parties
where defendant was aware of the acts at the time of his encounter with the
victim); McMorris v. State, 205 N.W.2d 559 (Wis. 1973) (defendant allowed to
establish what defendant believed to be turbulent and violent character of
victim).
4. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 552 (1973) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring) (Judge Bazelon notes that "the requirement of corroboration,
particularly rape, has come under sharp attack in recent years .... Numerous
justifications have been advanced for the requirement of corroboration in sex
cases. An examination of these rationales reveals a tangled web of legitimate
concerns, out-dated beliefs, and deep-seated prejudices."); see also Vivian
Berger, Man's Trial Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 13 (1977). The author describes situations where attorneys ask
women if they enjoyed the intercourse; they also inquire about victim's use of
birth control, her unescorted attendance at bars, existence of any illegitimate
children, and number of prior sexual experiences. WILLARD GAYLIN, THE
KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND 207 (1982) ("It was important to taint [the
decedent] a little bit, and here we see that inevitable part of the adversarial
process that demands a 'second assault' on the victim. Bonnie must be made -
at the minimum - an accomplice to her own killing.").
5. See, e.g., Scroggs v. State, 93 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956) (wife killed
the other woman); State v. Spaulding, 257 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1979) (actual
showing of deadly force unnecessary as assailant who made threats and
advanced with hand in pocket had stabbed defendant on prior occasion);
Gonzales v. State, 546 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (manslaughter where
husband shot lover in bed with wife); State v. Flory, 276 P.2d 458 (Wyo. 1929)
(defendant's father-in-law raped his daughter, defendant's wife; wife told
defendant about it; defendant, on seeing father-in-law a day later, killed him.
Held: jury could find voluntary manslaughter).
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open appeal to prejudice, is contrary to notions of equality
before the law.6 In allowing prosecutors to introduce evidence to
show that a murder victim is "an individual whose death repre-
sents a unique loss to society,"7 the Supreme Court has made the
decedent's character a relevant inquiry, without more, during a
capital sentencing hearing.8
In 1991, the Supreme Court revisited for the third time in
four years the relevance of evidence loosely characterized as vic-
tim impact evidence.' In 1987, the Court held that admission of
victim impact evidence without a showing that the evidence
related to a "circumstance of the crime," violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.10 After expanding that holding in 1989, the Supreme
Court unceremoniously overruled Booth v. Maryland11 and South
Carolina v. Gathers'2 in Payne v. Tennessee.13
Payne has produced considerable commentary, almost all
critical.' 4 Most of the criticism has focused on the inequitable
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2): "[E]vidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim
was the first aggressor [is admissible]."
6. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 3 (1985) ("life of every individual
must be taken... to be of equal value"; "lives in being must be of equal value,
equally deserving the protection of the law").
7. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) (quoting Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)).
8. Id. at 2608.
9. Id. at 2597. "Victim impact evidence" is somewhat ambiguous and
includes three different kinds of evidence. It may include the personal
characteristics of the victim, the impact on the victim's family, and family
members' opinions on the appropriate sentence to be imposed. See R.P.
Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retribution and Capital Punishment: A Philosophical
Critique of Payne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 25, 27 n.l1 (1992). Payne did
not resolve whether family members' opinions are admissible. Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
10. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987).
11. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
12. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
13. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
14. See Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering - A Personal Reflection and a
Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21 (1992). Berger finds that the
rule of Payne permitting victim impact evidence to influence decisions on life
and death both exemplifies and intensifies much of what is wrong in the use of
the death penalty. David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics: Explaining Payne v.
Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. RE,. 157 (1992). The author points out that
politics, not sound legal thinking, are responsible for the result in Payne.
Markus D. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41
ButT. L. REv. 85 (1993). The author argues that as a result of Payne, the capital
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and arbitrary results invited by the Court's holding and on the
poor quality of the Court's philosophical analysis. 5 Fewer corn-
sentencing hearing has become an officially sanctioned display of private
vengeance against the capital defendant, with the jury choosing between the
defendant and the victim. The Court has abandoned accuracy for the sake of
uniformity in capital sentencing. R.P. Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retribution and
Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Critique of Payne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L.
REv. 25 (1992). The author argues that Payne cannot be justified under either
retributivism or utilitarianism. Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of
Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VANED. L. REv.
1621 (1992). The author argues that the Court should not have allowed
admission of victim impact evidence because victim participation does not
further goals of sentencing; it leaves open the possibility that victim's opinions
as to appropriate punishment may be admitted during capital sentencing; and
that it will lead to disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants. K.
Elizabeth Whitehead, Note, Mourning Becomes Electric: Payne v. Tennessee's
Allowance of Victim Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 45 Apt.
L. REv. 531 (1992). The author sees Payne as changing the criteria used to
determine when the death penalty is appropriate, giving sentencers discretion
to impose the death penalty by weighing the victim's value to society.
For favorable analysis of Payne, see Keith L. Belknap, Jr., Recent Development,
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 275 (1992). The author states that "in contrast to
these decisions [Booth and Gathers], the Payne Court correctly reasoned that the
States are free to decide that the harm imposed on a victim's family is relevant
to the moral blameworthiness of a defendant." Elizabeth A. Meek, Note, Victim
Impact Evidence and Capital Sentencing: A Casenote on Payne v. Tennessee, 52 LA.
L. REv. 1299 (1992). She concludes that the Court correctly held that the
Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar to admission of victim impact
evidence in capital sentencing hearings. Stephen M. Sargent, Note, Payne v.
Tennessee: The Supreme Court Places Its Stamp of Approval on the Use of 'Victim
Impact Evidence' During Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 841.
The author argues that Payne achieves ajust result by striking a balance between
the rights of murder victims and the rights of capital murder defendants.
15. See Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering - A Personal Reflection and a
Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21 (1992). The author notes that
because of Payne's holding, unexpressed biases are available for counsel to
exploit - most significantly, race. David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics:
Explaining Payne v. Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 157 (1992). The author
describes the stunning philosophical error at the heart of Payne. that its
presence reveals that the Court bowed to politics. Markus D. Dubber,
Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 Burr. L. REv. 85
(1993). The author remarks that the newly created paradigm of Payne has
discarded the accuracy of capital sentencing and replaced it with uniformity,
leading to the possibility of arbitrary capital sentencing. Christopher W. Ewing,
Note, Payne v. Tennessee: The Demise ofBooth v. Maryland, 23 PAC. L. J. 1389
(1992). The author argues that one result of Payne is the introduction of tort
theory of compensation - derived through vengeance or compensation -
into death sentencing jurisprudence, a strictly criminal area. The decision may
be creating an environment where the sentencing of capital defendants can be
motivated by emotion or caprice. Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of
Allowing Victim Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VANt. L. REv.
1621 (1992). The author argues that the use of victim impact statements at
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mentators have focused on Payne's treatment of stare decisis.'6
That is the primary focus of this article. After a brief review of
Booth, Gathers and Payne, this article discusses the values that have
traditionally Supported stare decisis, most importantly, institu-
tional values relating to the rule of law.17 It also reviews what has
been called the "art" of overruling, a phrase coined by Professor
Israel in arguing that the Court has developed a set of criteria to
justify overruling precedent.'8 The article then analyzes Payne in
light of those criteria and finds it seriously wanting. Because of
serious questions about Payne's analysis of the role of harm in the
criminal law, this article speculates on Payne's future and argues
that it should have a short life span.' 9
II. BOOTH, GATHERS AND PArYim THE CONTINUING
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE CHARACTER OF THE
VICTIM AND THE IMPACT OF THE VICTIM'S
DEATH.
A state jury convicted Pervis Payne of the first degree
murders of Charisee Christopher and her two year old daughter
and of first degree assault upon, with intent to murder Charisse
sentencing will lead to disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants; also
Payne left open the possibility that the victim's opinions as to appropriate
punishment may be admissible. R. P. Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retributivism
and Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Critique ofPayne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L.
REv. 25 (1992). The author notes that the majority in Payne has abandoned
mens rea retributivism and replaced it with a retributivism in which one is
punished not only for all acts and consequences for which one possesses mens
rea, but also for all the harmful consequences of one's acts, regardless of mens
rea. However, the Court never offered any arguments tojustify the relevance of
harm in a capital context. K. Elizabeth Whitehead, Note, Mourning Becomes
Electric: Payne v. Tennessee's Alllowance of Victim Impact Statements During Capital
Sentencing Proceedings, 45 ARK. L. REv. 531 (1992). The author argues that
because the Payne court failed to establish parameters for admitting victim
impact statements, courtrooms are now open to theatrics, leading to arbitrary
sentencing rather than individualized determinations of fate of defendant.
16. See Ranae Bartlett, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Eviscerating the Doctrine
of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law Cases, 45 ARK. L. REv. 561 (1992), where the
author argues that the majority in Payne blatantly disregarded stare decisis when
it reached its holding; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in
Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991), where
the author questions Chief Justice Rehnquist's statements regarding deference
to precedent and the Court's traditional approach to precedent.
17. See discussion infra notes 119-69.
18. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REv. 211, 219.
19. See infra part IV.
1994]
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Christopher's three year old son Nicholas.20 The facts were
grisly.
On June 27, 1987, Payne injected cocaine and drank beer.
Later, he drove around town with a friend, the two men taking
turns reading a pornographic magazine. 2 During that time,
Payne made several visits to his girlfriend's apartment, located
across the hall from the victims' apartment. On his final visit
there, still unable to find his girlfriend, he entered the victim's
apartment where Charisse Christopher rejected his sexual
advances.22 Enraged, Payne brutally murdered Christopher and
her two year old daughter. Payne repeatedly stabbed Nicholas,
the three year old. Payne used a butcher knife to inflict several
wounds, some of which completely penetrated the child's body.23
During the sentencing phase of his trial, Payne called rela-
tives and experts to testify about his background and personal-
ity.2 The state called Nicholas' grandmother, who testified that
Nicholas missed his mother and younger sister, that he cried for
them and worried about them. 25 In his closing argument, the
prosecutor referred to the effects of the crimes upon Nicholas.
Specifically, he stated that Nicholas was conscious during the
brutal slayings of his mother and sister.26 In rebuttal, he again
emphasized the emotional loss caused by his sister's and
mother's deaths.27
The prosecutor also argued that "[t] here is nothing [the jury]
can do to ease the pain of [Nicholas's grandparents] .... There is
obviously nothing you can do for [the two decedents]. "28
20. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2599 (1991).
21. Id. at 2601.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2602. Chief Justice Rehnquist's factual account is far more
graphic. For example, his description of Nicholas' injuries included the
following: "Nicholas, despite several wounds inflicted by a butcher knife that
completely penetrated through his body from front to back, was still breathing.
Miraculously, he survived, but not until after undergoing several hours of
surgery and a transfusion of 1700 cc's of blood - 400 to 500 cc's more than his
estimated normal blood volume." Id. The Chief Justice's motive in developing
these facts is obvious. Apart from the merits of the decision - and the analysis
is highly questionable - the Court has "arouse [d] in the reader.., the natural
desire to avenge the outrage and to eliminate its perpetrator." Markus D.
Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 BuFF. L.
REv. 85, 128-29 (1993) (quoting Harris v. Vasquez, 943 F.2d 930, 967 (9th Cir.
1991) (Noonan, J., dissenting)).
24. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2602.
25. Id. at 2603.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
Although the jury could do nothing for them, he argued that the
jury could do something for Nicholas. The jury could tell
Nicholas by their verdict what kind ofjustice the system provides
a victim of a brutal crime.29
The jury sentenced Payne to death on each of the murder
counts. 3 ° The Tennessee supreme court affirmed, rejecting
Payne's assertion that the admission of the grandmother's testi-
mony and the prosecutor's closing argument violated the Eighth
Amendment as applied in Booth and Gathers.3 ' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to reconsider Booth and Gathers.
A brief review of those two decisions is necessary background to
understand the Court's decision in Payne.
A. Booth v. Maryland
2
In Booth, John Booth and Willie Reid entered the victims'
home to commit a robbery. Because Booth, a neighbor of the
elderly couple, knew that they could identify him, he stabbed.
them to death. 3
Booth was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder,
two counts of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.3 4 The
prosecution requested the death penalty.35 Prior to the sentenc-
ing hearing, the State Department of Parole and Probation com-
piled a presentence report concerning Booth's background. 6
Pursuant to a Maryland statute,37 the presentence report
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990).
32. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
33. Id. at 497-98.
34. Id. at 498.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 10 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609 (1990). The last three decades
have witnessed the rise of the victims' rights movement. The movement was
spurred by the perception that the crime victim's interests were being
subordinated to the interests of the state and the rights of the accused. A
victim's post-crime role in criminal proceedings was that of a witness, nothing
more. See generally Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, The Victim's Movement:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. Rsv. 1, 3 (1984). In his 1984 Crime
Victim's Week proclamation, President Reagan stated, "For too long America's
criminal justice system has protected the rights and privileges of the criminal
before the victim." Id. at 2 n.7. In response to the perceived need to increase
the victim's role in the prosecution of his victimizer, statutes have been enacted
on both the state and federal levels. The provisions of the statutes vary: many
address compensation for the victims of the crimes; others require that victims
be kept informed about the prosecution of offenders; a majority have gone
further by ensuring that the victim has the opportunity or legal right to play a
1994]
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included a victim impact statement (VIS) describing the impact
of the crime on the victim and the family.38
The lower courts found that the emotional harm to the vic-
tims' family and the personal characteristics of the victims were
relevant because it revealed the full extent of the harm that the
criminal defendant had caused. 9 A closely divided Supreme
Court reversed.4 °
The majority held that evidence relating to the victims' per-
sonal characteristics and to the impact on the family was irrele-
vant in a capital sentencing hearing.4' The function of the
capital sentencing hearing, according to the Court, was to
"express the conscience of the community on the ultimate ques-
tion of life and death,"42 and the key to such a determination was
the defendant's blameworthiness. Specifically, a jury must make
an "individualized determination whether the defendant should
be executed, based on the 'character of the individual and the
circumstances of the crime."' 43 Focusing on the character of the
victim or the impact on the family, without more, might lead to
the imposition of the death penalty based on a factor unknown
to the accused at the time of the crime.44 The Court premised its
holding on the proposition that factors not relating to culpability
are irrelevant in assessing whether an individual may be sub-
jected to the death penalty. Thus, "[a] llowing the jury to rely on a
VIS ... could result in imposing the death sentence because of
factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were
irrelevant to the decision to kill."45
During the same term, the Court had held that a defendant
may be subject to the death penalty if he acted with reckless dis-
part in the prosecution and the sentencing of the criminal. Donald J. Hall,
Victim's Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. Rv. 233,
233-34 (1991).
38. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1987). There were two
types of information conveyed to the jury through the use of the victim impact
statement in the Booth case: (1) the emotional trauma suffered by the family
and the personal characteristics of the victims and (2) the family members'
opinions and characterizations of the crimes. The type of emotional trauma
suffered by family members is like that experienced by the Bronsons' son: he
testified that he suffered from lack of sleep and depression, and was "fearful for
the first time in his life." Id. at 499-500.
39. Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098, 1124 (Md. 1986).
40. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 497 (1987).
41. Id. at 502-03.
42. Id. at 504 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1986)).
43. Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).
44. Id. at 505.
45. Id.
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regard towards the consequences of his action.46 Booth rejected
the state's argument that mere knowledge of "probable conse-
quences" was sufficient to allow the use of VIS. The Court did so
because of concerns about disparity of treatment of defendants
based simply on whether a victim's family happened to be "artic-
ulate and persuasive in expressing their grief and the extent of
their loss."4 7 Such a result would lead to the arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty.
The Court also questioned whether different human worth
of the victim was a permissible basis to mete out the death pen-
alty. It rejected the obvious implication of relying on the victim's
character, that some members of society are entitled to greater
protection than others.48
Finally, the Court recognized that, were VIS admissible, the
defendant would be entitled to rebut the evidence of good char-
acter.49 Apart from concerns about the ability to rebut the evi-
dence of good character, the Court found the idea of a
"minitrial" on the victim's character both "unappealing" and a
distraction that would lead the inquiry away from the relevant
issue, the offender's culpability.5"
B. South Carolina v. Gathers51
In Gathers, the victim, Richard Haynes, was sitting on a park
bench when Gathers and three companions met him.52 Haynes
suffered from mental problems and was highly religious.5"
Because Haynes refused to talk to him, Gathers and his compan-
ions assaulted Haynes, beat him and broke a bottle over his
head.54 Before leaving, Gathers beat Haynes with an umbrella
and then inserted it in his victim's anus. 5 Later, Gathers
returned and stabbed Haynes to death.56
After the beating, Gathers and his companions searched
Haynes' bags in an effort to find something to steal.57 The bags
contained religious articles, including a religious prayer, relying
46. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987).
47. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987).
48. Id. at 506.
49. Id. at 506-07.
50. Id. at 507.
51. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
52. Id. at 806-07.
53. Id. at 807.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
1994]
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on sports' metaphors about being a good sport in life.5" The
perpetrators also found Haynes' voter registration card in his
wallet.
59
During the guilt phase of Gathers' murder trial, the state
introduced the victim's personal articles found at the scene of
the crime without reference to their content.6" That evidence
was reintroduced during the sentencing phase of the trial.6 '
During closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the content
of those items in urging that the jury impose the death penalty.6"
The prosecutor used the "Game Guy's Prayer" and the voter
registration card to humanize the victim.65
The South Carolina supreme court found that "the prosecu-
tor's remarks conveyed the suggestion that appellant deserved a
death sentence because the victim was a religious man and a reg-
istered voter,"' 4 and found that the argument violated the
Court's holding in Booth. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in order to reconsider its holding in Booth.65 Instead, the Court
58. Id. "The Game Guy's Prayer" reads as follows:
Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask
for any easy place in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me. I
only ask you for the stuff to give you one hundred percent of what I
have got. If all the hard drives seem to come my way, I thank you for
the compliment. Help me to remember that you won't ever let
anything come my way that you and I together can't handle. And help
me to take the bad break as part of the game. Help me to understand
that the game is full of knots and knocks and trouble, and make me
thankful for them. Help me to be brave so that the harder they come
the better I like it. And, oh God, help me to always play on the square.
No matter what the other players do, help me to come clean. Help me
to study the book so I'll know the rules, to study and think a lot about
the greatest player that ever lived and other players that are portrayed
in the book. If they ever found out the best part of the game was
helping other guys who are out of luck, help me to find it out, too.
Help me to be regular, and also an inspiration with the other players.
Finally, oh God, if fate seems to uppercut me with both hands, and I
am laid on the shelf in sickness or old age or something, help me to
take that as part of the game, too. Help me not to whimper or squeal
that the game was a frameup or that I had a raw deal. When in the
falling dusk I get the final bell, I ask for no lying, complimentary
tombstones. I'd only like to know that you felt that I have been a good
guy, a good game guy, a saint in the game of life.
59. Id. at 809.
60. Id. at 807.
61. Id. at 808.
62. Id. at 808-09.
63. Id.
64. State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988).
65. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, South Carolina v. Gathers, 488 U.S. 888
(1988) (Petitioner argues that certiorari should be granted because Booth was
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extended Booth beyond admission of a VIS to include the prose-
cutor's closing argument.66
A closely divided court found that absent a showing that
Gathers was aware of Haynes' personal characteristics, the evi-
dence was irrelevant to the offender's culpability.67 Booth indi-
cated that victim impact evidence might be relevant if it related
to the circumstances of the crime.6" Given that there was no evi-
dence that Gathers read the religious tract or the voter registra-
tion card, the state could not argue that Gathers murdered
Haynes because he was religious or a registered voter.69 Hence,
the content of Haynes' papers was irrelevant because it was not a
circumstance of the crime reflecting on Gathers' culpability.
C. Payne v. Tennessee 70
By 1991, the coalition that held Booth together in 1989 had
further unraveled. Specifically, in 1990, Justice Souter replaced
Justice Brennan,71 a member of Justice Powell's majority in Booth
and the author of Gathers. In Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for a majority of six justices.72
At the core of the dispute about VIS is the role of harm in
criminal sentencing. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Payne
focused on the premise, central to Booth and Gathers, that victim
impact evidence does not "reflect on the defendant's 'blamewor-
wrongly decided). Theoretically, Gathers could have overruled Booth because of
Justice Powell's retirement and the subsequent appointment of Justice
Kennedy. Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67,
70 n.14 (1990). However, in her dissent,Justice O'Connor asserted that though
she was prepared to overrule Booth, Booth did not apply. South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 813-14 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In her
estimation, Booth eliminated consideration only of the victim's family in the
sentencing phase, but not consideration of information about the victim. Id. at
813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Disagreeing with this distinction, Justice
White stated in his concurrence that unless Booth was overruled, they must
affirm the judgment below. Id. at 812 (White, J., concurring).
66. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
67. Id. at 811-12.
68. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10.
69. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811-12.
70. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
71. Gey, supra note 65, at 70.
72. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2601 (Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter, J.J., joined.
O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which White and Kennedy, J.J.,
joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in Part II of which O'Connor and
Kennedy, J.J.,joined. Souter,J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy,
J.,joined. Marshall,J, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun,J.,joined.
Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined.).
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thiness'," 73 and the related premise that "only evidence relating
to 'blameworthiness' is relevant to the capital sentencing
decision."74
The ChiefJustice relied on a number of arguments to rebut
Booth's central premises. First, Rehnquist relied on an argument
made in earlier dissents, 75 that, in fact, "the assessment of harm
caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged has
understandably been an important concern of the criminal law,
both in determining the elements of the offense and in deter-
mining the appropriate punishment."76 He cited Justice Scalia's
example in his Booth dissent,77 of two equally culpable bank rob-
bers, each of whom fires a gun at a guard.78 If the gun fires and
the guard dies, the defendant is guilty of murder and may be
subject to the death penalty. If the gun misfires, the defendant is
obviously not guilty of the substantive offense of murder and is
not subject to the death penalty. Even absent the death penalty,
jurisdictions typically punish attempts less severely than they do
the completed crime.79
Chief Justice Rehnquist also provided a short history of sen-
tencing, starting with Exodus and Lex talionis and ending with the
1987 Federal Sentencing Guidelines,80 to demonstrate that
" [w] hatever the prevailing sentencing philosophy, the sentencing
authority has always been free to consider a wide range of rele-
vant material.""1 Among factors relevant to sentencing is the
nature of the harm.82
73. Id. at 2605.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
77. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605. The Chief Justice further illustrates his
point by comparing two defendants: each participates in a robbery, and each
acts with a reckless disregard for human life. However, one robbery results in
the death of a victim which allows for the imposition of the death penalty, while
the second robbery, in which no death occurs, does not.
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1988) (if the offense so
attempted is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, the person guilty
of such attempt is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for one-half
the term of imprisonment prescribed upon a conviction of the offense so
attempted); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 110.05 (McKinney 1987) (as initially enacted, all
attempts were classified one grade below the classification of the crime
attempted; subsequent legislation classified five attempts at the same
classification as the consummated crime).
80. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.3
(Nov. 1992).
81. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606.
82. Id.
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
The Chief Justice contended that Booth and Gathers miscon-
strued earlier Supreme Court decisions. Prior to Booth and Gath-
ers, the Court had held that a defendant was entitled to be
treated as a "'uniquely individual human bein [g],' "83 but that the
Court had never held that a defendant was to receive "considera-
tion wholly apart from the crime which he had committed."84 In
context, according to Payne, all that the Court meant by insisting
on focusing on the individual's uniqueness was that a defendant
could not be prevented from introducing mitigating evidence.
The cases relied on by Booth and Gathers had not held that a
defendant could have evidence relating to the value of the vic-
tim's life excluded from the jury's deliberations.8 5
Payne characterized the Court's precedent differently from
Booth: the Court has held, in effect, that ajury is entitled to hear
"relevant, unprivileged evidence," and that a state "must allow [a
jury] to consider any relevant information offered by the defend-
ant."86 But "beyond these limitations .. the Court has deferred
to the State's choice of substantive factors relevant to the penalty
determination. "87 Because, according to Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, harm is relevant "to assess meaningfully the defendant's
moral culpability and blameworthiness,"88 Booth was wrong in rul-
ing victim impact evidence inadmissible.
The Court was also concerned about a perceived unfairness
to the State. Under the Court's earlier holdings preventing the
state from barring mitigating evidence, capital defendants typi-
cally introduce evidence aimed at creating jury sympathy for the
defendant.89 The Court cited a somewhat ambiguous statement
by the Tennessee supreme court that in light of the "parade of
witnesses [who] may praise the background, character and good
deeds of Defendant . . ., without limitation as to relevancy,"9 fair-
83. Id. at 2606-07 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976)).
84. Id. at 2607.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2608 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06
(1987)).
87. Id. (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2608-09.
90. Id. at 2609. The statement is ambiguous because it suggests that the
Tennessee Supreme Court believed Payne's evidence to be irrelevant. The
Supreme Court has not held that a capital defendant may introduce irrelevant
evidence. It has defined broadly evidence that is relevant to mitigate the
offender's culpability. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986)
(holding as relevant a jailor's testimony concerning the defendant's good
behavior in jail while awaiting trial); Eddings v. United States, 455 U.S. 104, 113-
14 (1982) (holding a sentencer may not as a matter of law refuse to consider any
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ness required that the state be allowed to introduce evidence
relating to the character of the decedents.
That left one important issue for the Court: should it over-
rule Booth and Gathers? And if so, what about stare decisis?91 The
Court's discussion of an unquestionably important aspect of the
decision was brief: after observing that stare decisis promotes
important values,92 and is a "wise policy,793 the Court stated three
propositions about stare decisis. One, the Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent when the controlling precedent
is "unworkable or... badly reasoned."94 Two, adherence to pre-
cedent is least compelling in constitutional cases because "correc-
tion through legislative action is practically impossible."95 Three,
"[c] onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests
are involved . . ." by comparison to cases involving "procedural
and evidentiary rules."96
The Chief Justice cited thirty three cases in the past twenty
terms in which the Court had overruled constitutional decisions
by "[a] pplying these general principles."97 Without stating explic-
itly that Booth and Gathers had proved unworkable, the Court con-
cluded by observing that those cases were decided by narrow
margins, with "spirited" dissents that challenged the "basic
underpinnings of those decisions."" Further, the Court
observed that Booth and Gathers "have defied consistent applica-
tion by the lower courts. " '
relevant mitigating evidence such as the background and upbringing of the
defendant); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(individualized sentencing determinations require an examination of the
defendant's character and record). If the problem in Payne were the admission
of irrelevant evidence, the appropriate remedy would be to exclude that
evidence, not to open the Court to other irrelevant evidence. Ewing, supra note
15, at 1441.
91. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2609-10.
92. Id. at 2609. "[I]t promotes the even handed, predictable and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process." Id.
93. Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2610 (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2611.
99. Id.
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III. PA FE V TENNESSEE AND STARE DEcIsIs
In impressive recent articles, two commentators have argued
that Payne represents a sea change in the conservative Court's
death penalty jurisprudence."' The desire to reshape the law
governing the imposition of the death penalty may best explain
Payne's cavalier treatment of stare decisis.10 This section discusses
Chief Justice Rehnquist's cursory treatment of stare decisis and
then develops some of the values reflected in the doctrine,
ignored in his haste.
A. Payne's View of Stare Decisis
In Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist sets up different standards
for analyzing the role of precedent in the Supreme Court. The
first important distinction is whether the case before the Court
involves property or contractual rights as opposed to procedural
or evidentiary rules."0 2 The interests in stare decisis are strongest
in property and contractual rights cases. The second relevant
consideration is whether the case before the Court involves a
constitutional question or a statutory question.10 3 In constitu-
tional cases, according to the ChiefJustice, interests in stare decisis
are less compelling than in statutory construction cases.10 4 The
Chief Justice intimates that precedent ought to be easier to over-
rule in close cases decided over vigorous dissents. 0 5 Finally, the
"Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent"10 6 if the
earlier decision was badly reasoned or unworkable. While Payne
recognizes that stare decisis is supported by important values and
policies, it suggests that in a constitutional decision involving
procedural or evidentiary rulings stare decisis is a matter of
convenience.
The Chief Justice did not address the particularly striking
feature in Payne, that the Court was dealing with recent prece-
dent where the most plausible explanation for the Court's deci-
sion to overrule the case was the change in Court personnel.
100. Dubber, supra note 14, at 86 ("The capital sentencing hearing was
originally designed to allow for an individualized sentencing determination
.... Now the hearing appears as an officially sanctioned display of private
vengeance . . . ."). Gey comments on how the Payne decision collapses the
earlier Gregg decision's objective of eliminating arbitrariness in death
sentencing. Gey, supra note 65, at 89.
101. Dubber, supra note 14, at 149-50.
102. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2610-11.
106. Id. at 2609 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
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That gave rise to Justice Marshall's powerful dissent,1"7 his last on
the Court,' in which he charged that the basis of the Court's
decision was power, not reason.1 °9 His dissent was undercut to
some extent byJustice Scalia in his concurring opinion in which
Scalia collected numerous instances in which Justice Marshall
had given precedent short shrift."' Justice Scalia was more can-
did than other members of the Payne majority in admitting that
the decision to overrule Booth and Gathers was a result of changes
in Court personnel."'
In an exhaustive footnote, the Chief Justice listed thirty
three cases over the past twenty terms of the Court in which it
overruled previous constitutional decisions." 12 He suggested that
those thirty three decisions support the "general principles" that
he identified.' 13
Examination of those thirty three cases does not fully sup-
port the Chief Justice's "general principles."" 4  For example,
none of the cited cases involves precedent as recent as two years
old. Few of the cases were decided by closely divided courts and
then quickly overruled after a change in Court personnel. 1 5 But
there is some support for the Court's assertion that special defer-
ence is due cases involving contract or property rights where par-
ties may have ordered their affairs in light of previously decided
cases." 6 By contrast, no one can seriously argue that Pervis
Payne considered the Court's holding in Booth when he chose his
homicide victims. There is also support for the view that special
107. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavells, DoubleJeopardy, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6,
1992, at 5.
109. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring). An example where Justice
Marshall gave short shrift to stare decisis. Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n
of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 249
(1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
111. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2610-11 n.1.
113. Id. at 2610.
114. Bartlett, supra note 16, at 572.
115. Id. at 574. The author writes that "in none of these cases did the
Supreme Court overturn a two-year old decision as it did in Payne v. Tennessee."
Id.
116. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 687 (1879); Gelpcke v. City of
Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175 (1863); see also Wilbur Larremore, Stare Decisis and
Contractual Rights, 22 HARv. L. REv. 182 (1908-09).
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deference is appropriate in statutory construction cases.117 A
lesser standard is in order in constitutional cases in light of the
difficulty of the constitutional amendment process."' The only
effective way to remedy past mistakes is through the process of
overruling an erroneous decision. But that still leaves open
whether overruling Booth was warranted.
B. Stare Decisis and Institutional Values
One would have thought that stare decisis was the corner-
stone ofjudicial restraint' and that the doctrine would be enti-
117. See Frank Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 422, 426 (1988) ("Courts should attach a meaning to a statute,
then let Congress act or not .... Congress can correct mistakes"); see also Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938) ("if only a question of statutory
construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine
so widely applied throughout nearly a century"); Burn et, 285 U.S. at 406
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
it be settled right .... [t]his is commonly true even where the error is a matter
of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation").
118. See Knox v. Parker 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1870) (The "Legal
Tender Cases") ("it must be remembered that, for weighty reasons, it has been
assumed as a principle in construing constitutions . . . that an act of the
legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the Constitution is
so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt") (quoting
Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117, 123 (Pa. 1811)). Note, Constitutional
Stare Decisis, 103 HARv. L. Rv. 1344, 1349 (1990) (acknowledging that
"normative critics ... argue convincingly that stability concerns should play a
role in constitutional decision making; when a judge is unsure whether
precedent should be overruled, stability concerns may tip the balance").
But see D.H. Chamberlain, Decisions of Constitutional Questions, 3 HARV. L.
REv. 125, 129-30 (1889) (finding that the Knox Court did not follow precedent
in making its decision); Easterbrook, supra note 117, at 427-28. The Article V
Amendment process requires the concurrence of Congress and the President,
keeping in mind that there is a one-house veto within Congress. Some
problems arising during the amendment process could be: coalitions built to
block the amendment; the priorities of Congress have changed since the law
was first enacted; time constraints; trade-offs in concessions for votes on an
amendment may be too high a price to pay for what was originally demanded;
and a change in the composition of the Congress.
119. One of the basic elements of judicial restraint is the adherence to
precedent. SeeJ. Skelly Wright, The Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A
Defense ofJudicial Activism in an Age of Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 487, 490 (1987); Justice Lewis Powell, Stare Decisis, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
281, 287-88 (1990). Justice Powell concludes that "recent challenges to
traditional stare decisis ... call for relaxation or even outright elimination of
stare decisis in constitutional cases ... this view of stare decisis also has little to
commend it." Henry Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD.
L. REv. 1, 7 (1979). Here, Monaghan finds that Justice Douglas' and others'
views of stare decisis could have "destabilizing" consequences.
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tled to more deference than it was accorded in Payne, suggesting
that it is more a matter of convenience than principle. The Chief
Justice might have cited Justice William 0. Douglas's views on
stare decisis developed in a 1949 law review article and in his judi-
cial opinions.'20 For example, Douglas argued, consistent with
Payne, that the difficulties involved in correcting erroneous con-
stitutional decisions made overruling precedent more appropri-
ate in constitutional cases."2 Elsewhere, the constraining effect
of precedent has been under attack by various radical critics of
the legal system who see the law as a vehicle to manipulate the
powerless and who argue that law is based on power not princi-
ples. 22 Those critics, like Justice Douglas, were the targets of
conservatives and surely make odd bedfellows for the likes ofJus-
tice Scalia and the Chief Justice.
Well placed members of the Reagan administration did take
a radical view of stare decisis. For example, Attorney General
Meese argued that a prior case is binding only on the parties,
presumably leaving the Justice Department free to retest settled
case law by acting contrary to governing law.1 23 Assistant Attor-
ney General Charles Cooper was sharper in his criticism in his
ultimately cynical remarks, for example, "that stare decisis has
always been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and
liberals. Its friends, for the most part, are determined by the
needs of the moment."1 24
Payne's treatment of stare decisis is no surprise to those who
view law with cynicism and who contend that law is politics.
1 25
But one would have expected a more conscientious defense of
stare decisis from the Supreme Court. Payne did list the following
120. Justice William Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949).
121. Id. at 746-47.
122. See, e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983).
123. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 983
(1987).
124. Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 402 (1988).
125. See Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHio
ST. L.J. 411, 413 (1981). The author argues that there is a threat created when
either a judicial or political body has effective power. Checks and balances
were created to limit the threat of tyranny. "Once that happens, though, the
distinctions between the political and judicial processes ... begin to blur." Id.
Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1685 (1982). The author argues that critical
scholarship could reinforce cynicism in the profession. Louis B. Schwartz, With
Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. REV. 413, 423 (1984).
Schwartz argues that "central to the CLS outlook are the propositions that law
and politics are one." Id.
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values supported by adherence to precedent: ". .. it promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and con-
tributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial pro-
cess." '2 6 The Court stated that reliance and predictability are not
particularly important in a case like Payne, but the Court ignored
the other values.
Whether the Court harms its public image by disavowing its
own precedent, especially in a case in which the change in Court
personnel so readily explains the result, may be difficult to
prove.1 27 But anyone who has taught in law school knows that
students often express cynicism about the stability of the law and
argue that decisions are nothing but individual judge's predilec-
tions, unguided by any other rule than their own personal val-
ues.1 21 Payne is hardly the first decision that has given support to
that view. Dean Carrington has argued that when law professors
teach that view, we are contributing to the corruption of the pro-
fessional and to the disrepute of the profession. 29 If the
Supreme Court teaches the same cynicism to the bar, one would
expect that the profession's disrespect would be that much
greater and that the profession would communicate to the public
a similar disrespect for the law.
Stare decisis is a partial rejoinder to that cynicism. The values
supporting stare decisis, but glossed over by Payne, include equality
before the law and the image of justice. l o As argued by justice
126. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
127. See James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested In a
Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REv. 345,
355 (1986). Rehnquist argues that evidence that the Supreme Court is
delegitimated when it overrules precedent would be "hard to adduce. The
results of a survey of public opinion taken after an overruling, or series of
overrulings, would likely depend on the popularity of the substantive change in
the law." Id. Justice Antonin Scalia implied in his concurrence in Payne that the
public will not mind a change in the law as long as the change is in accord with
the public's sense ofjustice. "A decision, contrary to the public sense ofjustice
as it is, operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect for the court and for
law itself." Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (dissenting opinion) which quotes Peter
Szanton, Stare Decisis: A Dissenting View, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 394 (1959)).
128. Dean Carrington has argued that professors who teach that view
should not do so in the legal academy. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River,
34J. LEGAL EDuc. 222 (1984).
129. Id. at 227.
130. See Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What Is It and What It Isn't;
When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 605, 627 (1990)
(quoting Thomas S. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective
Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201, 235-37 (1965)).
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Frankfurter, adherence to precedent demonstrates "the wisdom
of this Court as an institution transcending the moment."131 As
stated elsewhere, "stare decisis reassures the public that the
Court's decisions are not arbitrary""3 2 and that the Court is
"hedged about by precedents which are binding without regard
to the personality of its members."133
That stare decisis is an assurance that justices are deciding
cases on other than mere personal value preferences is an impor-
tant point. For example, over the twenty year period during
which the Supreme Court has worked out its death penalty doc-
trines, a significant number of judges of widely different political
persuasions have come to a rough consensus on certain mini-
mum requirements before a state can execute a criminal defend-
ant. 134 Consensus is some assurance that a justice is not simply
imposing his or her own value preferences. 3 5
Payne's treatment of stare decisis is ironic. The presidents
who appointed members of the current conservative majority of
the Court criticized the Court for judicial activism and promised
to appoint judges dedicated to judicial restraint.13 6 At the same
131. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
132. Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1344, 1349
(1990).
133. Id.
134. See Chief Justice Burger's position in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980); ChiefJustice Rehnquist's positions in Satterwaite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249
(1988); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), and Dawson v. Delaware,
112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992); Justice Powell's position in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976); Justice Kennedy's positions in Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct.
2222 (1992), and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Justice
Blackmun's positions in Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), and McKoy
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990);Justice Brennan's position in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972);Justice Souter's position in Morgan v. Illinois, 112
S. Ct. 2222 (1992);Justice Douglas' position in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972); Justice Stevens' position in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Justice Stewart's position in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Justice
O'Connor's positions in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), and
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Justice Marshall's position in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); and Justice Thomas' position in
Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992). That is, every justice on the Court
since 1972 has found the imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional
under some circumstances.
135. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1344,
1349 (1990).
136. For Nixon's view on appointing members to the Court, see Tom
Teepen, For GOP, Appointing Justices Became Ideological Exercise, L.A. DAILY J., July
3, 1991, at 6 ("Reacting against the Warren Court's enforcement of defendant's
rights at a time when he was playing law-and-order politics, Nixon set out to
reverse the Court ideologically. One of his appointees, William H. Rehnquist,
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time, vocal critics of the Court have urged judges to rely on the
original intent of the framers of the Constitution." 7 Originalism
claims a number of virtues, foremost that reliance on original
now leads the reactionary majority. ); for Reagan's view on appointing
members to the Court, see Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV. L. R~v.
1344, 1349 (1990), where the author notes that Reagan promised to appoint
"judges committed to judicial restraint and a conservative view of the
Constitution." For Bush's view on making Supreme Court appointments, see
Tom Teepen, For GOP, AppointingJustices Became Ideological Exercise, L.A. DAILYJ.,
July 3, 1991, at 6 ("Presidents Reagan and Bush perfected the process Nixon
began. Potential nominees are taken apart and examined for the right
reactionary attitudes.").
137. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICtARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 364 (1977) ("[w]hy is the 'original intention'
so important? ... A judicial power to review the Constitution transforms the
bulwark of our liberties into a parchment barrier"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 159 (1990) ("[t]he interpretation of the Constitution
according to the original understanding, then, is the only method that can
preserve the Constitution, the separation of powers, and the liberties of the
people"); Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 360
(1981) ("I write from the ... bias that original intent is the proper mode of
ascertaining constitutional meaning, although important concessions must now
be made to the claims of stare decisis"); Henry Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court
Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1, 7 (1979) ("But what of those of us who have
a relatively narrow view ofjudicial authority under the Constitution, particularly
those of us who would assign determinative weight to original intent . .. in
interpreting Constitutional provisions? Can we too ignore the claims of stare
decisis? I would very much doubt that any amount of reflection will convince
me to embrace such a view, for its consequences are, for me, potentially far too
destabilizing."); JUSTICE ANTONIN SCAJIA, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) ("no basis for believing that supervision of the
evolution would have been committed to the courts .. .originalism seems...
more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic
system").
Raoul Berger and Jefferson Powell conducted a debate on original intent
through law review articles. See Raoul Berger, Original Intention in Historical
Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 296, 303 (1986) ("the very materials [Powell]
collates demonstrates that from earliest times when courts spoke of 'intention'
they meant, as Professor Samuel Thorne concluded, 'actual intent' (quoting A
Discourse Upon the Exposicion and Understanding of Statutes (S. Thorne ed., 1942))
as a consequence of Jefferson Powell's The Modern Misunderstanding of Original
Intent, 54 U. Ciii. L. REV. 1513 (1987) (acknowledging Berger as the "most
prolific and uncompromising contemporary intentionalist writer on
constitutional topics," and that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Attorney General
Meese are both "public advocates of 'original intent' as the only legitimate
method of constitutional interpretation."). See Raoul Berger, Reflections on
Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 5, (1986) ("my thesis was and remains
that the Court is not empowered to reverse the unmistakable intention of the
Framers"); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 986
(1987) ("The Constitution, the original document of 1787 plus its
amendments, is and must be understood to be the standard against which all
law, policies and interpretations must be measured.").
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intent avoids the evil perceived in the idea of a living constitu-
tion."' The living Constitution is illegitimate because federal
judges who believe in the living Constitution engage in "the sub-
stitution of some other set of values for those which may be
derived from the language and intent of the framers ... 139
Nonoriginalist judges are "a small group of fortunately situated
people with a roving commission to second-guess Congress, state
legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers con-
cerning what is best for the country."140
Originalism is beset with a number of problems. For exam-
ple, many originalists recognize that original intent, even if iden-
tifiable, must be ignored under certain circumstances.1 4 ' Thus,
Judge Bork argued that he would not vote to dismantle the com-
merce clause jurisprudence that has led to the development of
the administrative state.' 42 Some cases are apparently so well
established that even a "strong" originalist like Justice Scalia
would not urge overruling Brown v. Board of Education and Mar-
bury v. Madison.'43 Examining Justice Scalia's opinions often
138. See, e.g.,Justice William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 695 (1976).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 698.
141. See Henry Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD.
L. REv. 1, 7 (1979). Monaghan questions whether those who have a narrow
view of judicial authority under the Constitution, particularly those who place
weight on original intent, can ignore stare decisis because of the destabilizing
effect of doing so. Justice Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi4 57 U. CIN.
L. REv. 849, 861 (1989). He discusses an example of a new statute providing for
public lashing, which would not have been cruel and unusual punishment in
1791, and notes that he doubts whether any federal judge - even an originalist
- would sustain the punishments against an Eighth Amendment challenge.
142. See A Talk With Judge Robert H. Bork, DIsTricT LAw., May/June 1985,
at 32.
143. SeeJustice Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evi4 57 U. CIN. L.
REv. 849, 861 (1989) ("[Allmost every originalist would adulterate [originalism]
with the doctrine of stare decisis - so that Marbury v. Madison would stand
even if Professor Raoul Berger should demonstrate unassailably that it got the
meaning of the Constitution wrong." Scalia agrees with the holders of this view
of originalism.).
But see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDIcIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 245 (1977). He states that
"in Brown, Warren did not merely shape the law, he upended it; he revised the
Fourteenth Amendment to mean exactly the opposite of what its framers
designed it to mean, namely, to leave sufferage and segregation beyond federal
control, to leave it with the States, where control over internal, domestic
matters resided from the beginning." Id.
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
leaves one guessing when he will follow original intent and when
he will modify his views consistent with intervening precedent.144
A detailed critique of originalism is beyond the scope of this
paper. But originalism's proponents have promised a great deal,
notably, that it avoids the pitfalls of subjective value preferences
of individual judges.145 In arguing against the proponents of a
living constitution, they argue that justices who do not adhere to
original intent are merely relying on their own values.
Properly understood, stare decisis serves the institutional val-
ues loudly trumpeted by advocates of originalism. What better
evidence that a judge is not imposing his own values than his
acquiescence in established precedent?146 What better evidence
144. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701 (1991) (Justice
Scalia found that life in prison without benefit of parole does not violate the
Eighth Amendment because it has no support in text and history of the Eighth
Amendment. Observe though that even there, he relies on original intent but
then suggests that death penalty cases may not be resolved by reference to
original intent.); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (tag rule in
personal jurisdiction where Justice Scalia argues that due process analysis is
different if a basis ofjurisdiction is traditional or if it developed later in history;
he also suggests that if an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions abandon a
historical rule, then due process may disallow that form of service).
145. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY. THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 290 (1977) ("judges were
not left free to exercise the supreme 'legislative power' of the people, to revise
the Constitution in accordance with their own predilections"); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 160 (1990) ("without adherence to the
original understanding" it could lead to the Constitution not being binding on
the judges; the choice would then be to either "rule by judges according to
their own desires or rule by the people according to theirs"); EDWIN MEESE III,
The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 983 (1987) ("however the Court
may interpret the provisions of the Constitution, it is still the Constitution
which is the law and not the decision of the Court"(quoting CHARLES WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 470-71 (1923))); Henry
Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1979)
("[S] tare decisis is simply an unwelcome nuisance for the commentators whose
concerns center upon the outer boundaries and expanding territories of
constitutional law. Because these scholars do not believe that any of their
favorite constitutional edifices will be torn down, they are intent upon
rationalizing the remainder of the subject according to their individual beliefs.
That process necessarily involves some overruling, and these commentators are
willing to abandon stare decisis for the opportunity to lodge their own
constructions within the Court"); Justice Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 849, 863 (1989) ("the main danger in judicial
interpretation of the Constitution - or for that matter, in judicial
interpretation of any law - is that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law").
146. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overrling,
1963 SuP. CT. REv. 211, 216-17 ("To overcome [the] obstacle [of a potential
barrier to complete acceptance of judicial review], the Court must operate
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of restraint than when a judge substitutes the majority's view for
his own when the majority acts consistent with an established line
of cases?' 4 ' Proving that the public's perception of the Court is
enhanced by adherence to precedent may be difficult, but law-
yers can certainly understand when judges reflect deference to
precedent.1 48  Restraint in practice, rather than in rhetoric, cer-
tainly educates the bar; lawyers who witness judicial restraint
surely are less cynical about the rule of law and its power to guide
the judiciary. 149
Payne failed to address the arguments in support of adher-
ence to precedent relating to the rule of law, its demonstration
that "disinterested decision-maker[s] [are] applying those funda-
mental values reflected in the Constitution,"150 and ultimately, to
the public's confidence in the Court's ability to do justice.
Payne's cursory treatment of those institutional values is especially
odd in light of the Court's subsequent division in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. 51
Court watchers widely assumed that Casey would be the vehi-
cle for overruling Roe v. Wade.'52 Over almost twelve years, the
within a framework that maintains its image as a disinterested decision-maker
applying those fundamental values reflected in the Constitution. A general
willingness to adhere to precedent has always been an important aspect of this
framework.").
Black's Law Dictionary defines judicial self-restraint as "self-imposed
discipline by judges in deciding cases without permitting themselves to indulge
their own personal views or ideas which may be inconsistent with existing
decisional or statutory law." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990).
147. See HenryJ. Bourguignon, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: His Principles
of Judicial Decision Making, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 251, 279 ("Harlan's belief in the
principle of stare decisis was put to the test when the prior controlling
precedent was one with which he had disagreed when originally decided. He
followed the precedent, but not without an audible note of displeasure.").
148. See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 404-05 (1988). The
author's two concerns with stare decisis are that (1) it is inherently subjective,
and therefore easily manipulated and (2) its place is to shelter error from
correction. He uses Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), as an example of the Court using
stare decisis as a matter of convenience, or using it when it is incorrect to do so,
by reading the holding incorrectly and thus not correctly applying it.
149. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling,
1963 Sup. CT. REV. 226-27.
150. Id. at 217.
151. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
152. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972). For support of the proposition
that Casey would be the vehicle for overturning Roe, see Tom Baxter, Election '92:
Keeping You Up to Date Despite Drama, Abortion Battle is Far From Over, ATLANTAJ. &
CONST., Apr. 27, 1992, at 6 ("[t]he decision in the Pennsylvania abortion case
will almost surely leave Roe v. Wade in tatters"); Elizabeth Neuffer, High Court
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Reagan and Bush administrations assembled their coveted
antiabortion majority. Those two administrations were rumored
to have used a litmus test on the abortion question as a precondi-
tion for nomination.1 53 Yet at the moment of decision, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, despite the sharp criticism of
their colleagues, voted against their own personal values.1 54
Although Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion attempted to
distinguish Casey from Payne on the degree of reliance that had
sprung up after Roe,1 55 the opinion was far more concerned with
Hears Arguments on PA Abortion Law; Case Could Affect Roe v. Wade Ruling,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 23, 1992, at 1 ("the justices might not completely overrule
Roe").
153. See Reagan Hit on Goals for High Court, CHi. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1985, at 9
(D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals judge suggests that Reagan and many senators
are guilty of "demanding adherence to a political line and seeking 'judicial
IOUs"'); David Savage, Liberals Still Suspect Court Nominees Face 'Litmus Test,'
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1987, at A20 (Senate liberals have accused Reagan
Administration and Senate conservatives of applying a 'litmus test' to the
nominees); cf. Joyce Price, Bush's Health Chiefs Must Toe Abortion Line, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1989, at A3 ("the Bush Administration acknowledged yesterday
it will use an anti-abortion litmus test to screen candidates for the government's
top health policy jobs").
154. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2875 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he emptiness of the 'reasoned judgment' that produced Roe
is displayed.., by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of the
brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the country, after more than 10
cases upholding abortion rights in this Court... the best the Court can do to
explain how it is that the word 'liberty' must be thought to include the right to
destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply
decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice."); see id. at 2876
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is not reasoned judgment that supports the Court's
decision; only personal predilection"); see id. at 2879 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("It
is difficult to maintain the illusion that we are interpreting a Constitution rather
than inventing one, when we amend its provisions so breezily."); see id., at 2880
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("reason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of
confusion"); see id. at 2882 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Imperial Judiciary lives.
It is instructive to compare this Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured
judges - leading a Volk who will be 'tested by following,' and whose very 'belief
in themselves' is mystically bound up in their 'understanding' of a Court that
'speak[s] before all other for their constitutional ideals' - with the somewhat
more modest role envisioned for these lawyers by the Founders.").
See id. at 2862 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part) ("The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be described as an
unconventional - and unconvincing - notion of reliance, a view based on the
surmise that the availability of abortion since Roe has led to 'two decades of
economic and social developments' that would be undercut if the error of Roe
were recognized. The joint opinion's assertion of this fact is undeveloped and
totally conclusory.").
155. Id. at 2809. While Payne considered weighing reliance heavily "in
favor of following the earlier rule in the commercial context, where advance
planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity," Payne, 111 S. Ct. 2597,
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institutional concerns reflected in stare decisis than in the reliance
argument. It gave a far more comprehensive analysis than did
Payne of the instances in which the Court has overruled prece-
dent and found those grounds absent in Casey.
The emphasis on institutional concerns was palpable in
Casey. For example, Justice O'Connor expressed concern that
overruling Roe "would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to
exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court
of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law."156 She argued that the
Court's power comes not from "spending money;" instead, its
capital comes from the "people's acceptance" that the Court is fit
to declare the meaning of the law.157 Key to that public accept-
ance is the belief that the Court "speak [s] and act [s]" in a manner
"grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and
political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled
choices that the Court is obliged to make." 58
Justice O'Connor emphasized that for a court to overrule
precedent too frequently "overtax[es] the country's belief in the
Court's good faith." 59 Simply arguing that the prior decision
was wrong is not enough because "[t] here is a limit to the amount
of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior courts." 6'
Instead, the Court would be seen as result oriented, intent upon
achieving particular results "in the short term."1 6
Commentators 62 and, at times, Supreme Court justices163
have argued that the standards for principled application of stare
2610 (1991), Justice O'Connor in Casey finds that there are high reliance
interests at stake: "the ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives" - and surmises that "while the effect of reliance on Roe
cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for
people who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be
dismissed." Id.
156. Id. at 2814.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2815.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall be Vested in a
Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. Rxv. 345,
358-59 (1986) (in listing eight characteristics for finding a "special burden"
when the Court overrules precedent, Rehnquist noted that "most of these
criteria are not as question-begging as (4)").
163. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2860 (1992)
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Rehnquist
complains that O'Connor's opinion contains an elaborate discussion of stare
decisis, yet she never applies this principle in dealing with Roe, therefore, it must
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decisis are too vague. Ironically, while decrying the imprecision
of the doctrine, some commentators seem to know when justices
are cheating and not following precedent.164 As with almost any
constitutional doctrine, there are hard cases at the margin where
reasonable people disagree with whether the Court is bending
the law. One federal court of appealsjudge has written that "[n] o
black letter guidelines determine when to follow precedent."165
But certainly, Supreme Court justices166 and many lower federal
court judgest67 believe that they know when they are following
be almost entirely dicta. He also notes that the joint opinion "follow[s] its newly-
minted variation on stare decisis." Id. at 2855.
164. See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 404 (1988) (two weaknesses
of stare decisis. "it is inherently subjective, and few judges . . . can resist the
natural temptation to manipulate it... and its avowed office is to shelter error
from correction").
165. Judge RuggeroJ. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When
Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 605, 627 (1990). Aldisert
sets standards for the use of stare decisis, by distinguishing between precedent
and persuasive authority.
166. SeeJustice Lewis Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 281 (1990). Justice Powell writes that "there is no absolute rule
against overruling prior decisions .... And where it becomes clear that a
wrongly decided case does damage to the coherence of the law, overruling is
proper .... [Ilt cannot be suggested seriously that every case brought to the
Court should require reexamination on the merits of every relevant precedent."
Id. at 286. Justice John P. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 9 (1983). Justice Stevens believes that "the question whether a case
should be overruled is not simply answered by demonstrating that the case was
erroneously decided and that the Court has the power to correct its past
mistakes. The doctrine of stare decisis requires a separate examination. Among
the questions to be considered are the possible significance of intervening
events, the possible impact on settled expectations, and the risk of
undermining public confidence in the stability of our basic rules of law." Id. at
9.
167. SeeJudge RuggeroJ. Aldisert, Precedent: What Is It and What It Isn't;
When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 605 (1990). Justice
Aldisert writes: "If facts in the putative precedent are identical with or
reasonably similar to those in the compared case, the precedent is recognized
as legitimate, and it is applied .... [B] ut if the material facts in the compared
case do not run on all fours with the putative precedent, the doctrine becomes
un dragone." Id. at 605. Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Text and Precedent in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 411 (1988). He states that "it is
my strong conviction that the concept of precedent has force and sufficient
discipline to decide that great percentage of cases that come to our court,
including constitutional issues; it is my observation that it in fact does so." Id. at
411. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The Conflict Between Text and Precedent in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 434 (1988). Justice Reinhardt
states that "every judge I have ever known is influenced by his fundamental
philosophy of law and of life, by the changes that have occurred in society, by
his view of his role as ajudge, and his view of the legal system, as well as by stare
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precedent and when they are free to abandon precedent. And
despite the lengthy footnote in Payne, when judged by the total
number of cases decided or reviewed by the Supreme Court, the
actual instances of overruling precedent are a small percentage
of the Court's total docket.168 Plausibly, sensitivity to institu-
tional concerns reflected by Casey's plurality opinion explains
why, contrary to popular perception, relatively few cases have
been overruled during the Court's history.'6 9
C. The "An" of Overruling Precedent
In one of the most important discussions of stare decisis, Pro-
fessor Israel found in Supreme Court decisions an "art" of over-
ruling precedent. 70 Contrary to the assertion that stare decisis is
merely a matter of convenience, Israel's analysis demonstrates
that the Court has usually followed certain constraints before it
has overruled precedent. The failure to do so has led to criticism
of the Court for ignoring the important values underlying stare
decisis.171
More particularly, Israel observed that despite references to
the "limited application of stare decisis in the field of constitu-
tional law,"' 72 the Court demonstrated a commitment to the
image as a "disinterested decision-maker applying those funda-
mental values reflected in the Constitution." 173
decisis. The choices involve personal, subjective elements, but they fit within an
orderly process of reasoning, within a logical, rational process of attempting to
determine the meaning of the law." Id. at 438.
168. SeeJustice Lewis Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. Rrv. 281, 284-85 (1990). Considering the Burger and Warren Courts, he
finds that "[o] n a rough average, the Court has overruled less than four cases
per term ... [b]ut when the totality of cases is considered, the general rule of
stare decisis remains a fundamental component of our judicial system." Id.
Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art'of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT.
REv. 211, 213-14. Professor Israel writes that "[f]or, despite its widespread
reputation as a Court most ready to 'disregard precedent and overrule its own
earlier decisions,' the Supreme Court in fact has directly overruled prior
decisions on no more than a hundred occasions in over a century and a half of
judicial review." Id.
169. SeeJerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling,
1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 217. Professor Israel finds that "the importance of stare
decisis in promoting an acceptable image of judicial review thus imposes a
special burden upon the Court in overruling its prior decision." Id.
170. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REV. 211.
171. Id. (The theme of the article is that Gideon failed to follow the
conventions, but could have and should have.).
172. Id. at 214 n.21.
173. Id. at 217. While Professor Israel's article preceded the Burger
Court, his observations about the Court's commitment to its image as a
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As identified by Professor Israel, the Court employs a
number of techniques in overruling precedent. First, the Court
has frequently relied on changing conditions. 74 Even justices
most opposed to overruling constitutional decisions have
acknowledged that the "law may grow to meet changing condi-
tions"'1 7 5 and that stare decisis should not require a "slavish adher-
ence to authority where new conditions require new rules of
conduct."'176
Second, the Court has cited the lessons of experience as
commanding a decision to overrule precedent.177 That is, a
prior decision may be rejected when it has failed to pass the "test
of experience. ' 7 The earlier decision may have created admin-
istrative difficulties and uneven results, or experience may have
shown the erroneous nature of factual or policy assumptions
upon which the original decision was based. 79
Third, overruling may be compelled by requirements of
later precedent. 8 ° Under this rationale, the Court suggests that
the decision overruled was wrongly decided. But the Court does
not rely simply on the error of the earlier decision. To do so
would make the decision appear to turn on a mere change in
court personnel. Instead, even when the Court has found the
earlier decision wrongly decided, the Court has buttressed its
position by demonstrating that the earlier decision had been
eroded by intervening precedent. Demonstrating inconsistency
between the original case and intervening decisions allows the
Court to argue, in effect, that it has to overrule the earlier case to
bring the current case in line with the intervening case law.' 8 '
"disinterested decision-maker" finds support in the go-slow approach taken by
the Burger Court. The Burger Court, which included a majority of justices
appointed by Republican presidents, surprised many observers by its failure to
overturn significant Warren Court precedent. See also VINCENT BLASI, THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1983).
174. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REV. 211, 219.
175. Id.
176. Id. Compare this to Scalia's dissent in Gathers or his concurrence in
Payne where he argues that older cases are entitled to greater deference. South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S, 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613-14 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
177. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REV. 211, 221.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 223.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 224. (E.g., United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R.R., 312
U.S. 592 (1941); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941)).
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The advantage of reliance on intervening precedent is that it
indicates that the Court's current decision is not simply a sudden
shift, otherwise explained by a change in court personnel: ".
the Court may properly emphasize that the downfall of the over-
ruled case was not the product of a 'little coterie of like minded
justices' recently appointed to the bench, but of a long line of
judges who, over the years, participated in the various undermin-
ing decisions."'
8 2
Unlike the assertion in Payne, Israel found that the Court has
recognized the significance of stare decisis in constitutional cases,
creating a "presumption of validity that attaches to the conclu-
sions expressed in prior opinions. " 18 1
Israel, like other commentators 84 and judges,'85 suggests
that the art of overruling serves important institutional values.
Specifically, those arguments "should be employed in the inter-
ests of both the logical persuasiveness of the Court's position and
the maintenance of the profession's confidence - and through
it the public's confidence - in the impersonal and principled
qualities of the judicial process."' 86
182. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
SuP. CT. REV. 211, 225 (quoting Francis Allen, The Supreme Court and State
Criminal Justice, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 191, 192 (1958)).
183. Id. at 227-28 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192
(1957); DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927)).
184. See Herbert C. Kaufman, A Defense of Stare Decisis, 10 HASTINGS L.J.
283, 287 (1959) (Professor Kaufman contends that once the Court has
interpreted a provision of the Constitution, their jurisdiction over the matter is
ended. If it is later thought to be wrong, it should be changed by
amendment.); E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1043,
1057 (1975) ("[A] system of case law will be too fluid and lacking in
cohesiveness, not so much unpredictable as discontinuous, without the strong
cement provided by the doctrine of stare decisis.").
185. SeeJustice Lewis F. Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 281, 286 (1990) (Powell gives three reasons for adhering to
precedent: it makes judges' work easier; it enhances stability in the law; and it
gives the law public legitimacy); Justice John P. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-
Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983) ("[A] rule that orders judges to decide
like cases in the same way increases the likelihood that judges will in fact
administer justice impartially ....").
186. Jerold J. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REV. 211, 229; see alsoJudge Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is
and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 605,
629 (1990) (Aldisert summarizes the various reasons for a Court's overruling of
earlier decisions: because of intervening developments in the law; because
precedent suffers from inherent confusion and would be a detriment to
consistency in the law; or because a precedent becomes outdated by changing
social mores).
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As discussed above, 8 7justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Sou-
ter appear to have adopted a similar view in Casey. 8 ' In light of
their sensitivity to institutional concerns in a case as controversial
as Casey, it is unclear why they were not similarly motivated in
Payne. The next section of this article examines Payne in light of
the art of overruling to demonstrate that under none of the
traditional arguments should the Court have overruled its recent
precedent. Hence the result can only be explained by the
change in Court personnel,18 9 leaving the Court open to justified
criticism for acting without restraint. 9 °
D. Payne and Artless Overruling
One commentator has documented the Court's "comedy of
errors" in its efforts to overrule Booth, including pressing the par-
ties to brief an issue that they had not asked the Court to
address.' Payne's treatment of stare decisis demonstrates a
degree of activism unusual by any measure. This section consid-
ers how a less activist Court might have dealt with Payne and how
wanting the Court's analysis was in light of traditional grounds
for overruling precedent.
As a matter of strategy, Payne's facts aided the decision to
uphold the imposition of the death penalty. 192 The murders
were brutal, unprovoked, with two entirely helpless children
among the victims.'93 But in light of those facts, one might spec-
187. See discussion supra notes 151-69.
188. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-09 (1992).
189. To Justice Marshall's charge that "[plower, not reason is the new
currency of this Court's decisionmaking," Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,
2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Scalia responded that "what would
enshrine power as the governing principle of this Court is the notion that an
important Constitutional decision.. . be left in place for the sole reason that it
attracted five votes." Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. SeeJerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art'of Overruling,
1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 269-70. Professor Israel points out that although the
decision of Gideon to overrule Betts would have probably been attacked
regardless of the methodology employed, had Justice Black utilized "the Art of
Overruling," he would have provided a foundation by which supporters could
answer such criticisms.
191. Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 67,
70 n.14 (1992). In its frenzy to reconsider Booth, the Court directed counsel to
brief the issue of Booth's constitutionality. Unfortunately, amidst all the sabre
rattling, the two issues which had prompted the parties to petition the Court in
the first place, were not even noted. Id. at 70 n.14.
192. See Justice Robert Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court:
Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 803 (1951) ("a large
part of the time of conference is given to discussion of facts").
193. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2601 (1991).
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ulate whether the prosecutor needed the victim impact evidence
to convince ajury to impose the death penalty. Payne expressed
concern about leveling the playing field to assure that the state
could effectively counter the defendant's mitigating evidence,
allowing the state to counter Payne's assertion that he was a wor-
thy human being with evidence about his victims and their fam-
ily.194 But the state had ample and obviously relevant evidence to
counter Payne's mitigating evidence.
Payne's defense was weak. His girlfriend testified about his
kindness towards her children and asserted that Payne did not
use drugs or alcohol. 195 His parents also testified that he did not
have a history of drug or alcohol abuse. 96 In light of the over-
whelming evidence to the contrary, those witnesses' testimony
must have been completely discredited.197
A psychologist testified that Payne was mentally handi-
capped and that he was an extremely polite prisoner.198 The
prisoner's good behavior is frail evidence. A prosecutor can eas-
ily diminish its significance by arguing that he did not demon-
strate good manners when he was not forcibly confined by the
state. The more telling evidence is that of mental handicap, but
it certainly cuts both ways. It reduces culpability insofar as retar-
dation may limit a person's ability to act with a fully functioning
will and with limited insight into moral choices. 199 But the
Supreme Court has upheld state statutes making future danger-
ousness a circumstance justifying the imposition of the death
penalty. 00 Mental incapacity may limit a person's ability to con-
trol himself in the future.20 1
194. Id. at 2608-09.
195. Id. at 2602.
196. Id. at 2603.
197. Payne passed the morning and early afternoon injecting cocaine and
drinking beer, Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2601 (1991); three cans of
malt liquor bearing Payne's fingerprints were found on a table near the body of
Lacie, and a fourth empty can was found on the landing outside the apartment,
Id. at 2602; a search of his pockets revealed a packet containing cocaine
residue, a hypodermic syringe wrapper, Id.; defendant was shown to have
purchased Colt 45 malt liquor earlier in the day, State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10,
13 (Tenn. 1990).
198. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2602 (1991).
199. See Peter Arenella, Diminished Capacity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
AND JUSTICE 612 (Sanford Kadish ed., 1983).
200. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 61 U.S.L.W. 4738 (U.S. June 24, 1993);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
201. Concern about an impaired person's future dangerousness explains
why society incapacitates the defendant even upon a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 1 (1985).
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In context, the victim impact evidence in Payne was overkill.
Indeed, the Tennessee supreme court found as an alternative
ground to uphold the death sentence that admission of the vic-
tim impact evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming
evidence of aggravating circumstances. 20 2 That suggests the first
possible basis upon which a less activist Court might have
reached the same result in Payne without overruling such recent
precedent.
The Supreme Court has applied harmless error analysis in
cases in which the state has imposed the death penalty.2 3 In
closely analogous instances, the Court has found that the death
penalty could be upheld based on a finding that admission of
otherwise inadmissible evidence during the death penalty phase
of the trial amounted to harmless error.20 4 Payne appears consis-
tent with that line of cases applying harmless error analysis. 2 5
Even if the Court did not find admission of VIS evidence
harmless, it might nonetheless have resolved the case narrowly.
Gathers and Booth indicated that an offender's knowledge of the
victim's personal qualities might be relevant. Gathers rejected the
state's argument that the content of Haynes' personal papers was
relevant because the prosecutor did not prove that Gathers was
202. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990).
203. See, e.g., Richard v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993) (in fact, the Court
has observed that "most constitutional errors have been held amenable to
harmless error analysis." (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081
(1993)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
204. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) (remanded to state
court for determination whether erroneous consideration of "coldness" of the
killing amounted to harmless error); Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093
(1992) (remanded to state court for determination whether improper
admission of evidence relating to membership in Aryan Brotherhood
amounted to harmless error); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990)
(remanded to state court to determine whether introduction of
unconstitutionally vague evidence amounted to harmless error). By contrast,
the Court has held on occasion that a constitutional error requires relief
without further inquiry into whether the error was harmless. See, e.g., Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (erroneous instruction on meaning of
"beyond a reasonable doubt" was not subject to harmless error analysis). The
Court's analysis in Sullivan suggested that its scope is quite narrow: "[In
Sullivan] there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment .... There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt would have rendered absent the constitutional error is entirely
meaningless." Id. at 2082.
205. Cf Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252-54 (distinguishing
between structural defects defying harmless error analysis and trial errors which
occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore
be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented").
1994]
198 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8
aware of their contents.2" 6 Had Gathers read the Game Guy's
Prayer, his knowledge concerning his victim's character would
have related to the circumstances of the crime making the evi-
dence relevant.20 7
Gathers did not resolve whether knowledge of the content of
Haynes' papers would have been sufficient or whether, in addi-
tion, the prosecutor would have to show that Gathers killed
Haynes because he was religious or carried a voters registration
card.20 8 Nor did Booth clarify whether it would be enough if
Booth knew that the elderly couple had children who cared
about them or whether the defendant had to intend to cause the
children pain by killing their parents.209
Payne might have resolved that question. The record sug-
gests that the defendant knew the Christophers.21 0 The prosecu-
tor may have been able to establish that the defendant knew not
just the victims but also the extended family. The Court might
then have resolved whether knowledge that his act would cause
the additional suffering was sufficient, or whether the defendant
had to act with purpose or intent to cause the additional suffer-
ing. The criminal law does not usually distinguish between
knowledge and purpose, with knowledge sufficient in most
instances.21 1 Even when the line is drawn, it is not a clear one.
For example, the Model Penal Code makes knowledge of attend-
ant circumstances sufficient to meet the definition of purpose.21 2
Thus, if charged with an offense requiring purposeful conduct,
an offender must desire to bring about a particular result, but
must only know of the attendant circumstances. Had the Court
adopted that distinction, the prosecutor may have prevailed in
Payne, because the defendant may have known the victim's family
206. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1990).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 812.
209. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987).
210. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1990) (defendant stated "it
had been almost a year off and on [in seeing the victim] in the backyard because
her kids had played with Bobbie's kids").
211. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 2 (1985).
212. "A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature
or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes
that they exist." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1985).
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and the effect that the killings would have on the family
members.
Had Payne relied on a narrow basis to affirm the death sen-
tence, it could have left intact recent precedent. That becomes
important when one considers that the arguments supporting
overruling Booth were so frail.
Judged by the traditional arguments for overruling prece-
dent, Payne comes up wanting. The first criterion identified by
Professor Israel, changed conditions,"' is obviously inapplicable
to precedent only two years old. Similarly, the third criterion,
that overruling is compelled by the requirements of intervening
precedent (the process of erosion),"4 is inapplicable for the
same reason: apart from Booth's dissenters' attempt to reexamine
the question,2 1 5 the Court had not eroded Booth. To the con-
trary, even with a change in Court personnel,216 the Court reaf-
firmed Booth in Gathers.
The second criterion, the lesson of experience, 21 7 was not
met, also in light of the short time span. Payne made a half
hearted effort to rely on that argument, specifically citing the fol-
lowing argument: "[Booth and Gathers] have been questioned by
members of the Court in later decisions, and have defied consis-
tent application by the lower courts. '218 That statement is mis-
leading. First, Booth and Gathers were not questioned in "later
decisions," but only in later dissenting opinions.2 1 9 Thus, the
statement amounts to little more than the obvious: the dissent-
ingjustices continued to disagree with Booth's holding. The sec-
ond part of the statement is also misleading. It cited only one
lower court decision to demonstrate that Booth and Gathers have
defied consistent application.22 ° On its face, the argument seems
frivolous - one divided lower court does not support the propo-
sition that lower courts have reached inconsistent results.
213. See discussion supra notes 174-76.
214. See discussion supra notes 180-81.
215. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 813 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Ohio v. Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
216. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
67, 70-71 n.14 (1992).
217. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Ovemling, 1963
Sup. CT. REv. 211, 221.
218. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991).
219. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 813 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
220. State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (Ohio 1990).
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Payne did not cite additional cases cited by Justice O'Connor
in her dissenting opinion in Gathers.221 But even expanding
inquiry to other cases decided between Booth and Payne does not
support the Court's conclusion concerning the kind of inconsis-
tent application that made necessary the decision to overrule
Booth.
Justice O'Connor cited four cases to demonstrate the "con-
siderable confusion" caused by Booth. She cited disagreement
between the South Carolina supreme court that read Booth
broadly and three courts that had read Booth more narrowly.222
One of those decisions is so cursory in its treatment of the issue
that one cannot tell whether the evidence may have been rele-
vant, for example, to the "circumstances of the crime."223
A second case, Daniels v. State, also offers cursory facts con-
cerning the contested evidence. 224 That makes difficult an
assessment, for example, whether the remarks were harmless
error. During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor relied on evi-
dence from the guilt phase concerning the victim's relationship
with members of his family, information that the defendant
probably did not know. 225 Hence, Daniels and Gathers did pres-
ent a conflict. In both cases, the prosecutor based an argument
during the penalty phase on evidence admitted during the guilt
phase of the trial, information unknown to the defendant at the
time of the murder. A third case, People v. Rich,226 was largely
consistent with Daniels.
221. See Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988); Moon v. State, 375
S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988); see also People v. Rich, 755 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1988); People
v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1987).
222. The South Carolina Supreme Court read Booth broadly in State v.
Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144 (S.C. 1988). The three courts O'Connor cited as
reading Booth narrowly are: the Indiana Supreme Court (Daniels v. State, 528
N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind. 1988)); the Georgia Supreme Court (Moon v. State, 375
S.E.2d 442, 450 (Ga. 1988)); and the California Supreme Court (People v. Rich,
755 P.2d 960, 993-94 (Cal. 1988), and People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250, 1271
(Cal. 1987)).
223. Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988).
224. Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988); Daniels v. State, 453
N.E.2d 160 (Ind. 1983).
225. Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind. 1988) ("Trial testimony,
relevant to guilt or innocence, may necessarily also reflect the nature of
personal relationships between parties .... The prosecutor tied the evidence
together in such a way as to give the jury an impression of the victim's life.")
Given that Daniels was on a robbery spree, he almost certainly did not know his
victims, thereby suggesting that he would not have been aware of the personal
relationships between the victim and his family. Id. at 777.
226. People v. Rich, 755 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1988).
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
Confusion, as a basis of overruling precedent, is no doubt
malleable. How much confusion justifies abandoning precedent
is a matter of degree. 227 A closely related problem is whether a
case like Booth created confusion or was simply resisted by lower
courts. Lower court's distaste for a decision may lead to unsym-
pathetic interpretation, not reasonably supported by the original
Supreme Court decision. It would be ironic to allow judicial civil
disobedience to lead to abandoning otherwise defensible
precedent.
Viewed with thatcaution, a reader would be hard pressed to
find fatal confusion in Booth. Booth rested on the premise that
the death sentence should be reserved for the most culpable
offenders and that the jury should not consider information
unknown by the offender.22 Given Booth's holding, Rich and
Daniels were wrongly decided. Evidence admissible for one pur-
pose does not justify otherwise impermissible argument. 229 And,
of course, by the time Payne was decided, that apparent conflict
or confusion had been resolved by the Court's discussion of the
issue in Gathers.
The only other decision cited by Justice O'Connor raised
the question whether the inappropriate reference to victim
227. See Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't;
When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 605 (1990). Aldisert
states that "[n]o black letter guidelines determine when to follow precedent....
It must be remembered that a judicial precedent may reflect as little as 51
percent of the opinion writer's point of view at the time of authorship." Id. at
627, 629. Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Text and Precedent in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (1988). Higginbotham explains that
"[t]here is a baseline and it is that point at which facile restatements of prior
holdings, restatements of cases and discovery of underlying principles, become
dissembling; but between blind adherence and dishonest statement lies a
sometimes significant area that does seem to reward the creative jurists with the
opportunity to impose their will." Id. at 413. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The
Conflict Between Text and Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 434 (1988). Reinhardt questions "under what circumstances should he
[the judge] vote to overrule precedent? . . . I believe we must give weight in
varying degrees to a number of factors .... " Id. at 439.
228. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987).
229. For example, evidence of prior criminal activity is universally
inadmissible to prove a person's propensity to commit a crime. FED. R. EvIn.
404(b). Prior crimes evidence has a number of permissible uses - as when it
relates to motive, intent or plan, or when it may be used to impeach a
defendant's credibility. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo,
619 F.2d 1124, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980). That the prior
crimes' evidence is admissible for one purpose does not allow the prosecutor to
argue that it establishes the defendant's propensity to commit a crime. FED. R.
EVID. 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 720 F.2d 1103, 1105 (1983).
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impact evidence amounted to harmless error.230 There are two
issues involved. First is whether harmless error applies at all.231
The second is whether, in a given case, the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.23 2 Confusion surrounding whether
to apply harmless error analysis applied to a violation of Booth
would last only as long as it took the Court to resolve the ques-
tion in the first instance. Whether error is harmless in any given
case inevitably requires subtle assessments of the entire trial rec-
ord. Uncertainty in deciding whether a constitutional error is
harmless is hardly unique to Booth.233 Further, Payne does not
eliminate or clarify the harmless error question. That is, under
post-Payne case law, (insofar as Payne recognizes that in some
cases impact evidence will be sufficiently inflammatory to be
inadmissible),234 courts will have to engage in harmless error
analysis. Thus, confusion over whether erroneous admission of
victim impact evidence is harmless is hardly sufficient to support
the sweeping assertion by Justice O'Connor or the Payne majority
that Booth produced inconsistent lower court results.
Nor does the only decision cited by Payne support that asser-
tion. In Huertas, the defendant was involved in a love triangle
230. People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1987).
231. Cases in which harmless error analysis has been held not applicable:
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 n.6 (1986); NewJersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450,
459 (1979); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972); Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963).
Cf cases in which harmless error analysis is applicable: see, e.g., Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Satterwaite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1989).
232. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) (case remanded to
reweigh the constitutionally acceptable aggravating and mitigating
circumstances or to engage in harmless error analysis); Stringer v. Black, 112 S.
Ct. 1130 (1992) (case remanded for reweighing of aggravating and mitigating
evidence or engaging in harmless error analysis); Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct.
731 (1991) (reviewing court has option of reweighing remaining evidence or
engage in harmless error analysis; case remanded); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738 (1990) (unclear whether error was harmless or whether Court
correctly weighed aggravating and mitigating factors, therefore remanded to
state court for determination).
233. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 835, 836 n.1 (1993): "We see no
reason to depart here from our normal practice of allowing courts more
familiar with a case to conduct their own harmless error analyses." Because
harmless error analysis is so fact sensitive and requires the review of the entire
record, the Supreme Court demonstrates great deference to the lower court
which has more experience working with the record. For example, in Dobbs,
one question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals erred when it refused to consider the full sentencing
transcript. Although the Court found that the Court of Appeals had erred, it
remanded the case for harmless error analysis, because it had not been asked
and did not engage in its own harmless error analysis.
234. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991).
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with his on-again off-again woman friend Elba Ortiz and his high
school friend Ralph Harris, Jr. When Huertas learned that Ortiz
was involved with Harris, Huertas warned Harris to stay away
from Ortiz.2"5 After a long evening of alcohol and drug abuse,
Huertas broke into Ortiz's apartment and stabbed Harris. 36
The Ohio supreme court vacated the sentence of death
because the state introduced a VIS during the sentencing phase
of Huertas' trial.2" 7 The report contained statements by the vic-
tim's parents, including the victim's father's view that Huertas
should receive the death sentence. The victim's parents testified
at trial, the father repeating his view about the appropriate sen-
tence and the mother testifying concerning her sense of loss and
the effect on the victim's son.23 8
Although the state attempted to distinguish Booth on several
grounds,239 the "confusion" referred to by Payne was the differ-
ence of opinion between the majority and two dissenting jus-
tices. 2' ° The chief justice concurred, urging the Supreme Court
to reconsider Booth and Gathers, stating that "[t]he fact that the
majority and two dissenters in this case all interpret the opinions
and footnotes in Booth and Gathers differently demonstrates the
uncertainty of the law in this area. "241
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Douglas argued in dissent that
"Booth stands for the proposition that the use of victim impact
evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial is constitution-
ally impermissible only when that evidence creates a substantial
risk that the sentencing decision will be based upon arbitrary and
235. State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ohio 1990).
236. Id. at 1061.
237. Id. at 1065.
238. Id. at 1062.
239. Distinctions between Booth and Huertas.
(1) an Ohio jury's recommendation of death is not binding on
the trial judge, while a Maryland jury makes the final determination of
sentence, State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (Ohio 1990); (2)
the admission of the victim impact statement was harmless in Huertas
because it was much shorter than the one at issue in Booth, id. at 1063;
and (3) the defendant was acquainted with the victim and his family in
Huertas, and not necessarily so in Booth, id. at 1064.
240. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1991) (using State v.
Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (Ohio 1990) (Moyer, C.J., concurring), to
support proposition that Booth and Gathers have defied consistent application by
the lower courts).
241. See State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1070 (Ohio 1990) (Moyer,
C.J., concurring) ("The fact that the majority and two dissenters in this case all
interpret the opinions and footnotes in Booth and Gathers differently
demonstrates the uncertainty of the law in this area.").
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irrelevant considerations." 24 2 He found support for that conclu-
sion in footnote 10 in Booth.
2 43
Footnote 10 raised the possibility that impact evidence
would be admissible if relevant because the evidence related to
the circumstances of the crime.244 In other words, a defendant
might have been aware of the impact that the killing would have
on the victim. Second, the note made reference to the fact that
Booth's holding had special application in capital cases.245
Finally, the Court suggested that the victim's character would still
be relevant under traditionally recognized exceptions, like that
found in Federal Rules of Evidence 404,246 allowing evidence of
the victim's peaceable nature to rebut the defendant's claim that
the victim was the aggressor in a case of self defense.24 7
Justice Douglas misread the last sentence in the footnote.
Booth observed that "[t] he trial judge . . . continues to have the
primary responsibility for deciding when this information is suffi-
ciently relevant to some legitimate consideration to be admissi-
ble, and when its probative value outweighs any prejudicial
effect. '248 In context, the last sentence cannot mean that in
death penalty litigation generally, the judge must do a case by
case analysis of relevance. That would undercut the explicit
242. State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058, 1070-71 (Ohio 1990) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
243. Id. at 1070.
244. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507-08 n.10 (1987) ("similar types
of information may well be admissible because they relate directly to the
circumstances of the crime").
245. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507-08 n.10 (1987) ("Our
disapproval of victim impact statements at the sentencing phase of a capital case
does not mean, however, that this type of information will never be relevant in
any context.... Facts about the victim and family also may be relevant in a
non-capital criminal trial.").
246. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2): "Character of victim: Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor [is admissible]."
247. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507-08 n.10 (1987) ("Moreover,
there may be times that the victim's personal characteristics are relevant to
rebut an argument offered by the defendant.") See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (2)
(prosecution may show peaceable nature of victim to rebut charge that victim
was aggressor). The trial judge, of course, continues to have the primary
responsibility for deciding when this information is sufficiently relevant to have
some legitimate consideration to be admissible, and when its probative value
outweighs any prejudicial effect. Cf FED. R. EVID. 403.
248. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507-08 n.10 (1987).
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holding of Booth.249 The reference to "this information" is nar-
rower. It refers to the information discussed in the footnote.
That is, even though under the three circumstances identified in
the note victim impact evidence may be relevant, for example, in
a noncapital sentencing hearing, it may nonetheless be inadmis-
sible under the traditional balance of probative and prejudicial
value.25" That is hardly a startling conclusion; that is why the
information is tucked away in a footnote, rather than in the body
of the opinion. The note restates an obvious point of law, rather
than undercutting the specific holding of the case. An unsympa-
thetic or careless reading of a Supreme Court decision is hardly
evidence that the case caused confusion.251
Booth was cited in numerous cases in addition to the small
handful cited by Payne and the dissent in Gathers.252 But those
cases hardly support the Court's sweeping conclusion that Booth
proved unworkable. The cases fall into a few categories. A signif-
icant number of cases analyzed whether improper admission of
victim impact evidence amounted to harmless error,253 an issue
discussed above. 254 A number of cases questioned whether a liti-
gant was entitled to retroactive application of Booth.255 Any
habeas corpus litigant is aware of the confusion in deciding the
retroactivity question, but no one can seriously claim that prob-
lem derives from Booth. As recognized by members of the
249. "[T]he introduction of a VIS at the sentencing phase of a capital
murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment." Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 509 (1987). ThatJustice Douglas was simply wrong in his reading of Booth
is supported by Paynes discussion of Booth. It rejected Booth in part because it
set up a per se rule of exclusion of VIS. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,
2609 (1991) ("We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of
victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth
Amendment erects no per se bar.").
250. FED. R. EVID. 403.
251. SeeJudge Patrick Higginbotham, Text and Precedent in Constitutional
Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 415-16 (1988). Judge Higginbotham
discusses how the duty of obedience owed by the lower courts to the Supreme
Court's decisions "is defined in substantial part by the accepted manner of
treating precedent, and presumably no other branch of government owes
decisions of the Court any greater duty of obedience than is owed by the lower
courts."
252. See, e.g., Pierson v. O'Leary, 959 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir. 1992);
Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991); McMillian v. State,
594 So. 2d 1253, 1273 (Ala. Ct. App. 1991).
253. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 500 (Fla. 1992); Routly v.
State, 590 So. 2d 397, 404 (Fla. 1991); Todd v. State, 410 S.E.2d 725, 730 (Ga.
1991); Pierce v. State, 586 So. 2d 1005, 1006 (Ala. Ct. App. 1991).
254. See discussion supra notes 202-05, 230-34.
255. See, e.g., Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991);
Evans v. Cabana, 821 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Supreme Court,25 6 the Court ushered in confusion in Teague v.
Lane57 in its effort to narrow relief for habeas petitioners.
The only other significant issue that arose post-Booth was
whether Booth applied only when sentencing was done by a jury
or whether it also applied when the sentence was imposed by the
court. Booth stated that the issue was "whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering
victim impact evidence."25 8 The Eleventh Circuit, for example,
focused on that statement in Lightbourne v. Dugger59 and held
that Booth was inapplicable when the death sentence was imposed
by the judge on the recommendation of the jury. By contrast,
the Illinois supreme court found that Booth applied to a sentenc-
ing judge who stated in a written explanation of the sentence
that he considered the victim impact statement.
260
The conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and the Illinois
supreme court may be overstated. In Lightbourne v. Dugger, the
court had an alternative basis of its holding, specifically, that the
error was harmless. 261 But a holding that a judge may impose
the death penalty based on the impact on the family and the loss
to society misses the point of Booth which announced a substan-
tive rule that harm, unknown to the perpetrator, is irrelevant
and, therefore, inadmissible.
262
Thus, Payne's strongest argument in support of overruling
recent precedent, that Booth created administrative problems, is
256. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 61 U.S.L.W. 4155, 4162 (US Jan. 26,
1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting with Blackmun,J., joining); Graham v. Collins, 61
U.S.L.W. 4127, 4139 (US Jan. 26, 1993) (Souter, J., dissenting with Blackmun,
Stevens, and O'Connor, JI., joining); and Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct.
1715, 1722 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting with Blackmun, Stevens and
Kennedy, 1J., joining).
257. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
258. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1987).
259. Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (l1th Cir. 1987).
260. People v. Simms, 520 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ill. 1988).
261. Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (l1th Cir. 1987).
262. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987) ("Allowing the jury
to rely on a VIS could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors
about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the
decision to kill."); see also Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 67, 74 (1992) ("It is essential to understand that the holdings of
Booth, Gathers, and Payne, do not pertain to all victim impact evidence. The
rules established in those cases apply only to victim impact evidence about
which the defendant was ignorant at the time of the crime."); R. P.
Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retributivism and Capital Punishment: A Philosophical
Critique of Payne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 25, 40 (1993) ("The Booth
majority seeks to limit the scope of desert by imposing a mens rea
requirement. . . . One does not deserve to be punished for acts or
consequences for which one does not possess the proper mens rea.").
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weak. The few inconsistent applications of Booth could have been
remedied (as the Court did in Gathers) by a clear holding by the
Court. Any student of constitutional law knows that Supreme
Court cases frequently require refinement and often produce
inconsistent results among lower courts. 6 ' Indeed, a conflict
among lower courts is one of the bases for the grant of the writ of
certiorari.264 Confusion, without more, seems a frail basis for
overruling precedent. No one would seriously argue that the
conflict among courts about the meaning of a Supreme Court
decision should be a sufficient condition tojustify its overruling.
Insofar as Payne rests on conflict among lower courts for its
hasty overruling of precedent, there appears a special irony:
Booth announced a brightline rule.265 A judge did not have to
balance probative and prejudicial value of the VIS on a case by
case basis. 66 As with almost any brightline rule,267 the Court rec-
ognized exceptions where the evidence might be admissible, for
example, if the evidence related to the circumstances of the
crime. 268 But Payne abandoned the brightline rule and had to
recognize that VIS may be inadmissible in any given case, if the
VIS was so inflammatory that it rendered the sentencing hearing
fundamentally unfair.269 If overruling Booth rested on any argu-
263. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2827 (1990) (result in a
given case is not dictated by precedent also if "reasonable jurists may disagree");
Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2501 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("To
survive Teague, [the rule] must be 'old' enough to have predated the finality of
the prisoner's convictions, and specific enough to dictate the rule on which the
conviction may be held to be unlawful."); Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212,
1217 (1990) (redefined "new rule" from Teague result is not dictated by
precedent if it is "suspectable to debate among reasonable minds"); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (Supreme Court refines Teague by applying its
holding to a capital case).
264. Sup. CT. R- 17(1)(a). See ROBERT STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT
PRACrICE §§ 4.3-4.4, at 196-202 (1986).
265. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (Payne holds
that "[i]f the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence
and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no
per se bar.").
266. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) ("In the event
that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides a mechanism for relief.").
267. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (creating a
brightline rule allowing the police to search the entire passenger compartment
when making a search incident to a lawful arrest of the driver of an
automobile). The Court specifically noted that its holding did not extend to
the vehicle's trunk. Id. at 460 n.4.
268. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 n.10 (1987).
269. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
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ment other than simple disagreement with its holding, it was that
Booth proved unworkably confusing.270 And yet, as developed
more completely below, the Court substituted a rule that will pro-
duce far more uncertainty.2 7 1
Payne obviously attacked the soundness of Booth's analysis.272
Disagreement with precedent alone has seldom provided a suffi-
cientjustification to overrule precedent.2 73 In the plurality opin-
ion in Casey, Justice O'Connor argued against overruling
precedent based only on disagreement with the earlier decision:
"There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be
imputed to prior courts."274 Disagreement without more indi-
cates that the only explanation of the changed result was the
change in court personnel, eroding the public and profession's
confidence that the case was decided on "impersonal and princi-
pled qualities of the judicial process." 275
IV. OVERRULING PAYME V. TEhNESSEE
Payne did not make a convincing case for overruling Booth
and Gathers.276 Payne can only be explained by the change in
Court personnel and represents a clear departure from the rule
of law.
This section of the article argues that Payne will be short
lived. President Clinton has already made one appointment to
the Supreme Court277 and has prospects for additional appoint-
ments. 278 While the President favors the death penalty,279 he is
270. See discussion supra notes 218-62.
271. See discussion infra notes 380-412.
272. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605, 2607 (1991).
273. See Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling,
1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 235. (The author remarks that the "dominant
characteristic of overruling opinions has been, however, the Court's consistent
reliance upon more than just the alleged superiority of the view of its present
membership as the basis for rejecting a precedent.").
274. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2815 (1992).
275. Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling, 1963
Sup. CT. REv. 211, 229.
276. See discussion supra notes 213-75.
277. SeeJohn M. Broder, Ginsburg Takes Oath for Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1993, at A5 (noting that Ruth Bader Ginsburg was sworn in as the
107th Supreme CourtJustice and President Clinton's first nominee).
278. Ted Gest, et al., Now, the Clinton Court, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 30 (intimating O'Connor, Stevens and Rehnquist, all of whom
have been ill, may be retiring soon). See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2854-55 (1992) (in which Justice Blackmun, then 83-years-old, stated
he "could not remain on [the] Court forever"); see also Tony Mauro, Looking
Forward, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at 14.
279. Jack Greenberg, Death Row, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at A19.
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unlikely to appoint conservatives with settled hostility to the
expanded role of the Bill of Rights over the past forty years. 2 0
Newjustices will not be as hostile as the current majority is to the
use of the Eighth Amendment to hedge the imposition of the
death penalty.
In light of what I have argued concerning the virtue of stabil-
ity, one might question how I can predict and urge that Payne be
overruled.8 1  My argument is two fold. First, this section
addresses the merits of the dispute whether Payne or Booth was
correctly decided. Payne's majority opinion 8 2 and Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion 83 roundly denunciated Booth. But
apart from their vituperative language, Booth was well reasoned
and consistent with moral principles of just desert.284
Second, Payne asserted that Booth proved unworkable, an
argument that did not bear close scrutiny. 85 By contrast, Payne
will create administrative difficulties as predicted by Booth,286
leading to minitrials on the value of victims' lives. Payne will
exacerbate disparities in the imposition of the death penalty that
deeply divided the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.28 7 Payne's asser-
tion that harm, without more, is relevant to an offender's moral
culpability will not withstand analysis; it will invite reexamination
280. See Terry Eastlund, Column Right, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at B7
("Clinton judges, he has said, would believe in what he calls 'an expansive view
of the Constitution' and 'the constitutional right of privacy.'"); see also Irritable
Panel Ends Hearings on Ginsburg, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 23, 1993, at A26 (noting
the Judge Ginsburg "declined to reveal her thinking on such deep and difficult
matters as the death penalty, which she said she had not fully considered").
281. See discussion supra notes 119-35.
282. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991) ("Booth deprives
the state of the full moral force of its evidence and may prevent the jury from
having before it all the information necessary to determine the proper
punishment for a first-degree murder.").
283. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Booth's stunning ipse dixit, that a crime's unanticipated
consequence must be deemed 'irrelevant' to the sentence [citation omitted]
conflicts with a public sense ofjustice keen enough that it has found voice in a
nationwide 'victim rights' movement.").
284. See Markus D. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is
Ready to Strike, 41 Burr. L. REv. 85, 135-36 (1993) (The Booth Court recognized
"that the details of a crime do not affect retributive desert in the capital
sentencing context because retributive theory, as applied to the death penalty,
recognizes only one type of harm, the qualitatively unique taking of human
life."); R.P. Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retributivism and Capital Punishment: A
Philosophical Critique of Payne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 25, 30 (1992) ("The
Booth Court embraced a mens rea retributive theory of culpability[.]").
285. See discussion supra notes 218-62.
286. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987).
287. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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because it is so out of line with major premises of the criminal
law.288 Finally, while the Supreme Court's death penalty case law
has not followed a smooth course, Booth was consistent with one
important line of precedent that limited the death penalty to the
most heinous and culpable offenders. 8 9 Payne is an aberration
when it is examined in light of twenty years of case law, a "sport"
in the law. Over the next several years, the Court will have to
reexamine hard cases in Paynes wake, and, in light of its flaws,
the Court will have the opportunity to revisit admissibility of VIS.
A. Payne 's Attack on Booth
Payne characterized Booth and Gathers as resting on two
premises: one that a VIS does not (necessarily) relate the defend-
ant's culpability and two that the focus at the sentencing phase
should only be on the defendant's blameworthiness, making
other evidence inadmissible. 290 Payne countered that harm has
always "understandably" been an important concern of the crimi-
nal law. 29 1 The Court cited Justice Scalia's example from his dis-
sent in Booth: "If a bank robber aims his gun at a guard, pulls the
trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the gun
unexpectedly misfires, he may not."29 2 The hypothetical rob-
bers' culpability is identical. Despite that, the law treats one
offender as a murderer, with the possibility of the death penalty;
in the other instance, the person may be guilty of attempted mur-
der and typically will be subject to considerably less severe pun-
ishment.29 From that example, the Court argues that the
criminal law treats equally culpable offenders differently. That,
according to the Court, demonstrates that something more than
culpability is relevant to punishment; the additional factor is the
nature of the harm caused by the offender. 294
The Court also argued that harm has been relevant through-
out history. Despite different principles that have guided crimi-
nal sentencing over time, harm has remained a predominant
concern. 295 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion underscored that
point where he criticized Booth's holding that "unanticipated
288. See discussion infra notes 296-375.
289. See discussion infra notes 436-39.
290. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1991).
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 519 (1987) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting)).
293. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1991).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2605-06.
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consequences must be deemed 'irrelevant' to the senteence" to
be a "stunning ipse dixit".
296
B. Payne: Overstating the Role of Harm
The criminal law does consider harm relevant to both the
substantive definition of a particular offense and to punish-
ment.297 There has been an active debate within the scholarly
literature whether that ought to be the case.298
This article does not revisit the debate whether the criminal
law ought to consider factors other than culpability to assess
criminality and punishment. It does focus on how Payne con-
tends that harm is relevant. Payne set up a simple syllogism: the
criminal law considers harm relevant to punishment; VIS relate
to harm; therefore, VIS are relevant to punishment.2 99 But
whether harm is relevant to punishment was not the issue in
Payne.
Payne casually asserted that the criminal law has made harm
relevant.300 Conceding that the criminal law has considered
harm relevant does not end the inquiry. Booth and Gathers recog-
nized that harm matters, but only if the defendant was aware of
the harm.30 Insofar as criminal law tradition was relevant in
Payne, the Court should have focused on the relationship
296. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
297. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness and Harm:
Balancing the Factors on Which Our Criminal Law is Dedicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283,
298 (1988).
298. See Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness and Harm: Balancing
the Factors On Which Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283, 289-90 (1988)
(Loewy's only rationale for the retention of harm as a relevant factor is that it
mirrors life: similar conduct begets different consequences.) He also points
out that when punishing for the harm caused can be grounded in the concept
of societal compensation which focuses on the criminal's debt to society. Id. at
310. See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis
on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1499 (1974)
(he argues that the explanation for the role of harm is a hold over from
outmoded notions of vengeance).
299. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605-06 (1991) ("[Tlhe
assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged
has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law, both in
determining the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate
punishment .... Congress and most of the States have, in recent years, enacted
similar legislation to enable the sentencing authority to consider information
about the harm caused by the crime committed by the defendant. The
evidence involved in the present case was not admitted pursuant to any such
enactment, but its purpose and effect was much the same as if it had been.").
300. Id. at 2605.
301. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12 (1989); Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987).
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between mens rea and the resulting harm. And here the law is
far more complicated than suggested by Payne.
Payne's brief history of the relevance of harm begins with
Lex talionis, "[a] n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."3 °2 In con-
text, the Court treats that as an example where harm is every-
thing, a strict liability system without regard to any culpability of
the offender, vengeance where the avenger is entitled to take a
pound of flesh without regard to the intent of the accused, a sys-
tem where the offender is put in the same state as his victim.
Biblical scholars disagree whether lex talionis was strictly
applied. Historical evidence suggests that some Jewish sects
rejected oral law interpretations that deviated from the literal
language of the Scripture.3 °3 But other historians have argued
that within the orthodox tradition, lex talionis was strictly applied
only to intentional killing, i.e., to murder.30 4
That the Biblical injunction to take an eye for an eye was not
to be taken literally is supported by another rendition of the eye
for an eye edict. Deuteronomy includes a "rule concerning the
man who kills another and flees to save his life."30 5 It directs the
Hebrews to create three centrally located cities "so that anyone
who kills a man may flee there."30 6 Deuteronomy distinguished
between murder and accidental killing. The text offers the
example where "a man may go into the forest with his neighbor
to cut wood, and as he swings his ax to fell a tree, the head may
fly off and hit his neighbor and kill him."307 That person was
entitled to safety in one of the three cities that the text directed
to be created. 0 8
By contrast to the accidental killer, "... if a man hates his
neighbor and lies in wait for him, assaults and kills him, and then
flees to one of these cities, the elders of his town shall send for
him, bring him back to the city, and hand him over to the
302. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605 (1991).
303. See MYER GALINSKI, PURSUE JUSTiCE: THE ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE
IN ANCIENT ISRAEL 97 n.81 (1983) (proposing that the Sadduces rejected the
Oral Law as taught by the Pharisees and rigidly applied lex talionis); Haim H.
Cohn, Penology of the Talmud, inJEWISH LAW IN ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 75
(Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971) (stating that "it was commonly assumed that the
Sadduces and the Karaites interpreted lex talionis literally since they rejected
"oral law" interpretations which deviated from the literal and grammatical sense
of the words employed by Scripture").
304. See DAVID DAUBE, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAw 107 (1969).
305. Deuteronomy 19:4 (New International Edition).
306. Deuteronomy 19:2-3 (New International Edition).
307. Deuteronomy 19:5 (New International Edition).
308. Deuteronomy 19:5 (New International Edition).
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avenger of blood to die." °9 Chapter 19 ends with a passage simi-
lar to that found in Exodus: "And thine eye shall not pity; but life
shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot
for foot.13 10 Whatever ambiguity exists in Exodus is clarified in
Deuteronomy. Harm matters, but punishment is not appropriate
unless mens rea exists, here, unless the person intended the
harm. The simplistic formulation must be refined: a life for a
life is appropriate only if the killer intended the harm. Desert
turns on more than the harm caused.
That should not be surprising to the student of the criminal
law. Typically, common law crimes required a showing that the
offender had acted in a malicious manner,3 11 as reflected in the
classic maxim that "an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is
no crime at all."31 2 That required more than a showing that the
offender did a wicked act. For example, in what amounts to a
textbook example, a sailor, intent on stealing rum from a ship's
hold, ignited the ship when he lit a match in order to see in the
dark hold. The Court of Crown Cases found that the sailor was
not guilty of a violation of the Malicious Damage Act absent
proof that he intended to burn the vessel.3"3 Harm alone is
insufficient to create criminality; some mens rea must run to the
harm.
The criminal law recognizes some instances to the contrary
in which an offender who is unaware of the harm may be guilty.
Those cases are the exception to the rule and usually involved
especially strong policy considerations. 3 14 The exceptions often
309. Deuteronomy 19:11-12 (New International Edition).
310. Deuteronomy 19:21 (New International Edition).
311. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I - Provocation,
Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REv. 243 (1986).
312. SANFORD KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 217 (5th ed. 1989) (quoting Blackstone).
313. Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox C.C. 550 (Ir. Cr. Res. 1877) (Eng.).
314. SeeJOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL LAw § 11.03(A),
at 119-20 (1989) (Dressier justifies strict liability as a utilitarian impulse in
which society balances the competing interests of fairness to the innocent
wrongdoer against the interests of society in deterring social harm differently
with public welfare offenses. In common law offenses greater weight is
accorded to the individual, whereas in public welfare offenses, the scales come
down on the side of society's interests.); Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability,
Dangerousness and Harm: Balancing the Factors on Which Our Criminal Law is
Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283, 285 (1988) (One exception is what is commonly
called a public welfare offense such as marketing impure food and drugs. It is
reasoned that the lack of culpability is of no great import because of the great
harm these substances can cause, and because relatively minor penalties are
imposed.); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. 2 (1980) (The Model Penal
Code accepts a standard of strict liability for statutory rape when the victim, is
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rest on the argument that the underlying conduct, even if the
facts were as believed by the actor, was immoral.315 The obvious
example is statutory rape in which strict liability has been
imposed with regard to the age of the victim. 16
During the nineteenth century, legislatures adopted various
measures in which the offender's culpability was irrelevant or in
which the prosecutor only had to show that the offender was neg-
ligent."1 7 In Morissette v. United States, the Supreme Court created
a strong presumption that a federal court should read a mens rea
into a statute when the crime has common law origins.3 18 In
assessing whether a crime involved conduct malum in se or
malum prohibitum, the Court found that strict liability offenses
typically do not involve severe penalties.3 19 Decisions subsequent
to Morissette have arguably narrowed the instances in which the
Court will presume that Congress intended an offense to be strict
liability.3 20
under the age of 10. It justifies its position by stating "no credible error
regarding the age of a child in fact less than 10 years old would render the
actor's conduct anything less than a dramatic departure from societal norms.").
315. See, e.g., Regina v. Prince, L.R.-2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875) (Eng.) (In
response to whether it was necessary to read in a requirement of mens rea, the
court replied, "I am of the opinion that we are not ... and for the following
reasons: The act forbidden is wrong in itself, if without lawful cause; I do not
say illegal but wrong."); White v. State, 185 N.E.64, 65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933)
("The sound doctrine underlying the rule that guilty knowledge is not required
to accomplish the crime of rape with consent is that the act of the accused is at
best an immoral one, and that he cannot enter upon the accomplishment of an
admittedly immoral act except at his peril. . . ."); cf. United States v. Feola, 420
U.S. 671, 685 (1975) (During an undercover narcotics sting operation, federal
agents were attacked by their quarry. In deciding the issue of whether
knowledge of the federal officers' identity was requisite for the charge of
conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Court said no scienter was necessary, and
though the defendant "may be surprised to find that his intended victim is a
federal officer in civilian apparel, he nonetheless knows from the very outset his
planned course of conduct is wrongful.").
316. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL LAw § 11.02
(B), at 119; Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness and Harm: Balancing the
Factors on Which Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REv. 283, 286 (1986);
see, e.g., People v. Ratz, 46 P. 915 (Cal. 1896); Heath v. State, 90 N.E.310 (Ind.
1910); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 42 N.E.504 (Mass. 1896); State v. Houx, 19
S.W. 35 (Mo. 1892).
317. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I - Provocation,
Emotional Disturbance and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REv. 243, 243-44
(1986).
318. Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
319. Id. at 256 (1952).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (The
Court characterized public welfare offenses in which no mens rea is required as
those offenses which detail the type of conduct which is potentially dangerous
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The Model Penal Code created a general culpability provi-
sion.3 ' Under § 2.02(3), the Code provides that if an offense
has no mens rea term, the court should read in a minimum of
recklessness.322 As stated by the Code drafters, "[t]his accepts as
the basic norm what usually is regarded as the common law posi-
tion."323 In a related subsection of the Code, the drafters also
provided that an articulated mens rea term is assumed to apply
to all essential elements of an offense. "[U] nless a contrary pur-
pose plainly appears,"3 24 the prosecutor must demonstrate that
the offender has the stated culpable state of mind as to each ele-
ment of the offense.
The effect of the Code is to impose a general requirement,
at a minimum, of subjective awareness of the risk that the
offender has created and of awareness not just of the act, but of
other material elements of the offense. 325 That becomes espe-
cially important in cases in which punishment increases based on
different degrees of harm. For example, many jurisdictions pun-
ish assault and battery of an officer more severely than assault
to the public welfare, and requires stringent public regulation: such as
possession of unregistered hand grenades, or the shipment of adulterated
drugs. The Court argued that dealing with dangerous items should alert a
reasonable person to the probability that regulatory measures are in place.). See
also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
321. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
322. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985) ("When the culpability
sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not proscribed by law,
such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly
with respect thereto."). Recklessness under the Code requires actual awareness
of the risk. The drafters divided over extending liability to an actor based only
on negligence. But § 2.02(3) states the Code's belief that the State must
demonstrate an actor's culpability in order to criminalize the action. Id. at
§ 2.02 cmt. 1.
323. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 5 (1985).
324. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1985).
325. The Model Penal Code requires "that unless some element of
mental culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the
offense, no valid criminal conviction may be obtained." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 cmt. 1 (1985). The Code provides that if the statute which sets forth the
elements of the crime is silent as to mens rea then a minimum of recklessness
will suffice. Id. at § 2.02(3). The Code defines "recklessness" as similar to
acting knowingly "in that a state of awareness is involved, but the awareness is of
risk, that is of a probability less than substantial certainty." Id. at § 2.02 cmt. 3.
As to negligence, the Code does not wholly reject it as a ground of culpability
but urges that it "not generally be deemed sufficient in the definition of specific
crimes." Id. at § 2.02 cmt. 4. The Code points out that when people know that
a criminal conviction may ensue from negligent conduct they are motivated to
take additional care. Id. at § 2.02 cmt. 4.
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and battery on a fellow citizen. 26 Under the culpability provi-
sions of the Code, the actor would not be held responsible for
the added harm, impairing an officer in his duties, unless he had
some awareness of status of the officer. 27 Greater harm, without
more, is irrelevant; harm that bears on culpability is relevant.
Thus, the Court's assertion in Payne that harm matters is
only half the story. True, harm is relevant in defining the sub-
stantive criminal law. For example, a person is guilty of an
offense if one harm results and a more serious offense if an addi-
tional harm takes place. But typically, the criminal law requires
culpability with regard to the aggravating circumstance.
Apart from defining crime, harm also matters in assessing
the sentence. That is uncontestably true in any death penalty
case: at a minimum, in capital cases, a death must have
resulted. 28 But again, the Court overstates the role of harm. As
early as 1794, legislatures began dividing murder into first and
second degree, a division that at one point was followed in the
vast majority of American jurisdictions.3 29 That reform, an effort
to limit the death penalty, was intended to preserve the death
penalty for the most heinous offenders. 330 It was not enough to
326. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (Deering 1993); ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1204 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-1 (West 1986).
327. For example, if the relevant statute were to provide that "[a] person
is guilty of assault on an officer if... [h]e... knowingly... causes bodily injury
to a law enforcement officer while the officer is in the performance of his
duties," the effect of MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (1985) would be that the
mens rea term of "knowingly" would run to all material elements. Given that
the evil that the statute seeks to prevent is harm to police in the performance of
their official duties, the status of the victim and the performance of official
duties would be material elements under § 1.13(10). Cf United States v. Feola,
420 U.S. 672, 672-84 (1975) (holding that knowledge concerning the identity of
a federal officer is not requisite for the crime of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, because the primary function of the statute was to protect both federal
officers and federal functions and no mens rea need attach to what the Court
deemed a jurisdictional element). But see United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 672,
696-99 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Stewart argued that the federal statute
mirrored state statutes which provide an aggravated penalty for assaults upon
state law enforcement officers. "Where an assailant had no such knowledge
[that his victim had official status], he could not of couse be deterred by the
statutory threat of enhanced punishment .... ").
328. See, e.g., Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant "who
does not kill, attempt to kill or intend that a killing take place or that lethal
force will be employed." (Edmund at 797.)); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
329. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 2 (1980).
330. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 2 (1980). The Pennsylvania reform
in 1794 seems to have limited the availability of the death penalty in felony
murder, making the offender subject to the death penalty only if a murder took
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kill or even to kill intentionally; it had to occur along with some
additional aggravating feature. Harm alone was not enough; the
actor had to reflect upon and intend the harm. 3 1
Voluntary manslaughter represents another instance in
which even intentional killing was not punishable by death even
before the Supreme Court began limiting the availability of the
death penalty.3 32 Different rationales have been offered for why
provocation reduces the grade of the homicide from murder to
manslaughter.3 3 3 Supporters of the different rationales have sup-
port in the case law that has not always grasped the subtle distinc-
tion between whether provocation is a partial justification or
partial excuse. 3 4 Some cases suggest that provocation is a partial
justification - the provoking actor has forfeited the full protec-
tion of the law by committing the provoking act.3 3 5 In lay terms,
the victim had it coming to him. Other cases3 3 6 and scholars
33 7
suggest that provocation is a partial excuse. It is a concession to
place during the commission of the felony, and unavailable if the death was
accidental.
331. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (1983) (The statute provides
that "a criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is
committed by an intentional killing." "Intentional killing" is defined as "killing
by means of position, or by lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate
and premeditated killing."). The 1794 statute provided that "all murder, which
shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other
kind of wilful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or which shall be committed
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary shall be deemed murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of
murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree." 1794 PA. LAWS, ch 257,
§§ 1, 2.
332. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 1 (1980). The Code's
comment states that "early statutes sought to differentiate among criminal
homicides for the purpose of withdrawing benefit of clergy from the more
heinous killings. This initiative led to the division of criminal homicides into
murder, which retained its status as a capital crime, and the lesser offense of
manslaughter." Id.
333. See, e.g., A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
292 (1976);Joshua Dressier, Rethinking the Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).
334. See, e.g., A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
292 (1976); Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).
335. See, e.g., State v. Fowler, 268 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Iowa 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Smiley v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Ky.
1930); Rex v. Gross, 23 Cox. Crim. Cas. 455, 456 (Crim. Ct. 1913).
336. See, e.g., Fisher, 8 Car. & P. 182 (1837); Rex v. Mouers, 57 D.L.R. 569
(1921) (Can.).
337. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 334; R.S. O'Regan, Indirect Provocation
and Misdirected Retaliation, 1968 CiuM. L. REv. 319.
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the "frailty of human nature,"338 that is, a person whose "reason
has been dethroned ... cannot be expected ... 'to guide his
anger with judgment.'339
Whether provocation is partial justification or excuse, the
harm is same as in murder; the victim is dead. Further, under
either explanation for the partial defense, the actor must actually
have been provoked.340 Even if provocation is a partial justifica-
tion and thus the decedent had it coming to him, a defendant
could not claim that while he did not know that his wife was hav-
ing an affair with the decedent, had he known, he would have
been entitled to a partial justification. The harm in both cases is
the same, a person who was not entitled to full protection of the
law has died. But in my hypothetical example, the defendant
could not interpose a claim of provocation if he was not pro-
voked. Harm matters, but only when the actor had the appropri-
ate mental state.
Payne makes a great deal of the fact that a person who
attempts to kill but who fails receives a less severe punishment
than one who succeeds.3 4' It then concludes that harm matters.
That has not been contested. Instead, while harm matters, the
Court ignores the fact that typically the criminal law requires
some mens rea to attach to the harm. One more example will
demonstrate that the Court's insistence that harm matters is
overstated. A person guilty of murder may receive the death pen-
alty or life in prison;34 2 a person guilty of attempted murder may
receive a term of years.3 43 Under the Model Penal Code, 3" for
338. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862).
339. O'Regan, supra note 337, at 323.
340. See WAYNE LAFAvE & AUSTIN Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 7.10(b), at
654-55 (2d ed. 1986). In order to use provocation as justification, the
provocation must be such to cause a reasonable man to kill, to lose his normal
self-control. Some examples where it has been held that a reasonable man may
be provoked into passion: when he or a close relative is hurt by violent physical
blows; when he is unlawfully arrested; or when he discovers his spouse in the act
of adultery. But the defendant must have been actually provoked, to the
standard of a reasonable man, in order to use this as a partial defense.
341. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
342. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 782.04(1)(b) (West 1992); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (Page 1993).
343. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664(1) (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 777.04(4) (a) (West 1992) (if offense attempted is a capital felony, then
attempt is a felony of the first degree); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(3) (b) (West
1992) (penalty for felony of first degree is a term of imprisonment not to
exceed 30 years or not to exceed life imprisonment); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.02 (Page 1953) (an attempt to murder is an aggravated felony of the first
degree); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (Page 1953) (whoever is guilty of a
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE
murder, an offender would be guilty of a first degree felony34 5
with a possible maximum sentence of twenty years or life impris-
onment,346 but a person guilty of an attempted murder would be
guilty of a second degree felony,347 with a maximum penalty of
ten years imprisonment.348 But another example demonstrates
that harm in the abstract is not what matters, but harm in light of
the offender's mens rea. Typically, negligent homicide and
involuntary manslaughter have punishments less severe than
attempted murder.3 49 For example, under the Model Penal
Code, negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree,35 ° with
a maximum penalty of five years.35 t Contrary to the Court's sug-
gestion in Payne, harm is not independently relevant in assessing
punishment. It becomes relevant only in light of the offender's
mental state.
The law of homicide recognizes two exceptions to this rule,
the unlawful act or misdemeanor manslaughter doctrine and fel-
ony murder. Under the unlawful act doctrine, a person may be
guilty of manslaughter if a death results from the actor's violation
of a misdemeanor or a felony not sufficiently dangerous to qual-
ify for the felony murder rule.3 2 As administered by some
felony other than murder or aggravated murder shall be imprisoned for an
indefinite term).
344. Under the Model Penal Code, criminal attempt is of the same grade
and degree as the most serious offense that is attempted. However, an attempt
to commit a capital crime or a first degree felony constitutes a second degree
felony. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985).
345. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1985).
346. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (1985).
347. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985).
348. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (1985).
349. Compare punishments for negligent homicide and involuntary
manslaughter with punishments for attempted murder, supra note 343. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (West 1992) (involuntary manslaughter carries a
punishment of imprisonment in a state prison for two, three or four years); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 782.07 (West 1992) (killing of a human being by culpable
negligence is deemed manslaughter, and constitutes a felony of the second
degree); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West 1992) (punishment for a felony of the
second degree is a terms of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.05 (Page 1953) (negligent homicide is a misdemeanor of the
first degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.21(B)(1) (Page 1953)
(misdemeanor of the first degree carries a punishment of not more than 6
months imprisonment).
350. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (1985).
351. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (1985).
352. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 7 (1980); LAFAVE AND SCOTr,
supa note 340, § 7.13(a), at 676; DRESSLER, supra note 316, § 31.30, at 484.
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courts, an offender may be strictly liable.353 The underlying
offense may require no mens rea. Even if it does, the offender
may be guilty of homicide without awareness of the risk of
death.35 4
That doctrine has been limited by the courts in many juris-
dictions, for example, by requiring some showing of culpability
on the part of the offender or by stringently applying notions of
causation.355 Other jurisdictions have abandoned it outright.3 56
Some courts have suggested that liability without fault, at least
leading to incarceration, may be unconstitutional, either as a vio-
lation of due process 35 7 or Eighth Amendment proportional-
ity.3 8 The drafters of the Model Penal Code unequivocally
rejected the doctrine because it "dispenses with proof of culpabil-
ity and imposes liability for a serious crime without reference to
the actor's state of mind."359
Like misdemeanor manslaughter, felony murder in its broad
application holds a felon strictly liable for a death resulting dur-
ing the commission of the felony.3 ° The felony murder rule has
been limited in part by legislative reform.361 Courts have fre-
quently criticized the rule and have devised a variety of doctrines
353. See, e.g., State v. Hupf, 101 A.2d 355 (Del. 1953); Baker v. State, 377
So.2d 17 (Fla. 1979); Armenia v. State, 497 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1986); Estelle v.
State, 17 A. 118 (N.J. 1889); People v. Nelson, 128 N.E.2d 391 (N.Y. 1955).
354. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 7 (1980). The Code finds
that the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule "dispenses with proof of culpability
and imposes liability for a serious crime without reference to the actor's state of
mind." Id.
355. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 7 (1980).
356. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 7 (1980).
357. See, e.g., State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986); State v.
Akers, 400 A.2d 38 (N.H. 1979); LAFAvE AND ScoTr, supra note 340, § 2.12(a),
at 156.
358. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
359. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 7 (1980).
360. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980).
361. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 n.78 (1980) (noting that
thirty-six jurisdictions have limited the felony-murder rule by dividing felony-
homicides into two or more grades, by lowering the degree of murder for
felony homicide, or by outright abandoning it); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(3) (a)-
(d) (McKinney 1987):
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: Acting either
alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, sodomy
in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual
abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and
in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate
flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the
death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in
any prosecution under this subdivision, in which the defendant was
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that have held it in check. 62 The Comments to the Model Penal
Code suggest that some courts have imposed "covert" limitations
on the doctrine, for example, "the use of especially demanding
interpretations of legal or proximate causation."363 Other
"overt" limitations include the merger doctrine3 64 and the
requirement that the underlying felony be one inherently dan-
gerous in the abstract. 365 Courts have also developed various
rules to limit felony murder when the killing is done by.other
not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative
defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit,
request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof;
and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument,
article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by
law-abiding persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other
participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or
substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other
participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or
serious physical injury.
Id.
362. See, e.g., United States v. Heinlein, 490 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the
Court found that unanticipated actions of a felon not in furtherance of the
common purpose could no more be attributed to other felons than the actions
of a policeman or victim could be attributed to them); People v. Satchell, 489
P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1972) (in determining whether a felony is inherently dangerous
for purposes of the felony murder rule, the California Supreme Court
determined that they should assess that felony in the abstract; they do not look
to the specific facts of the case to determine whether the felony was inherently
dangerous); People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966) (only such felonies as
are in themselves inherently dangerous to human life can support the
application of the felony-murder rule); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich.
1980) (Michigan Supreme Court held that in order to convict a defendant of
murder [under the felony murder rule], it "must be shown that he acted with
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm or with a wanton and willful
disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of his behavior was to
cause death or to inflict great bodily harm."); State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20 (N.J.
1977) (This opinion outlines two theories of felony murder: agency and
proximate cause. The opinion also limits extending the felony murder rule
beyond acts by the felon and his accomplice to lethal acts of third persons not
in furtherance of the felonious scheme.).
363. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980).
364. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980); see, e.g., People v.
Smith, 678 P.2d 886 (Cal. 1984); People v. Wilson, 462 P.2d 22 (Cal. 1969).
365. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (1980); see, e.g., People v.
Henderson, 560 P.2d 1180 (Cal. 1977); People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal.
1972); People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966); .
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than one of the participants or when the victim is one of the co-
felons.3 66
The existence of the felony murder rule may allow punish-
ment based on harm without proportional fault.3 67 But it hardly
supports the Supreme Court's cavalier statement that harm mat-
ters. Quite the contrary, the felony murder rule has been subject
to an enormous amount of criticism because it does produce
unfair and anomalous results.3 68 It is the odd and striking excep-
tion to the general rule of culpability. The idea in Payne that
harm independent of fault or mens rea is relevant to punishment
is on poor footing if the Court has in mind a doctrine like the
felony murder rule. The Supreme Court has recognized the crit-
icism of the rule and held that states cannot impose the death
penalty on a felon under the felony murder theory absent some
showing of individual culpability.3 69
Justice Scalia characterized Booth as follows: it imposed a
constitutional rule with "absolutely no basis in the constitutional
text, in historical practice, or in logic."3 7 0 He found its holding
that "a crime's unanticipated consequences must be deemed
'irrelevant' to the sentence" to be a "stunning ipse dixit,"3 71 that
"conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has
found voice in a nationwide 'victim's rights' movement."372
Finally, he described Booth as "egregiously wrong. "a73 While
ChiefJustice used less flamboyant language, the majority opinion
366. See, e.g., People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582 (Ill. 1973), affd 319
N.E.2d 511 (I1. 1974); People v. Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766 (Mich. 1963); State v.
Canola, 374 A.2d 20 (N.J. 1977); Commonwealth v. Redline, A.2d 472 (Pa.
1958).
367. See, e.g., State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (N.J. 1977) (The NewJersey
Supreme Court struck down the felony murder conviction of the appellant,
finding that "[i] t appears regressive... to extend the application of the felony
murder rule beyond its classic common-law limitation to lethal acts of third
persons not in furtherance of the felonious scheme. Gradations of criminal
liability should accord with [the] degree of moral culpability for the actor's
conduct.").
368. See, e.g., United States v. Heinlein, 490 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1972); People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353
(Cal. 1966); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980); State v. Canola, 374
A.2d 20 (N.J. 1977);JosHUA DRESSLER, supra note 316, § 31.07, at 464-65 (1987);
T.B. Macaulay, A Penal Code Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, Note M, 64-
65 (1837); cf David Crump and Susan W. Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder
Doctrine, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL. 359, 362-63, 370-71 (1985).
369. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
370. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
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takes a largely similar view of Booth.3 74 He asserted that, contrary
to Booth's central premise, "the assessment of harm caused by the
defendant as a result of the crime charged has understandably
been an important concern of the criminal law."3 75 That has
been the case both in defining the substantive offense and the
relevant punishment.3 76
This section of the article demonstrates how wrong Payne
was. Booth did not hold that harm was irrelevant. Instead, it
found that harm was irrelevant if the offender was unaware of
the harm.37 7 In other words, some mens rea had to run to the
harm. Rather than being "egregiously wrong" and a "stunning
ipse dixit," Booth's holding is consistent with core assumptions of
the criminal law.3 78 Only by setting up a strawman (that Booth
made harm irrelevant in all cases) could the Court challenge
Booth. Payne's central premise that harm matters independently
of an offender's awareness of the harm is the anomaly, resting
only on the exceptions to the general assumptions of the crimi-
nal law.
C. Overruling Payne
This article has argued that stare decisis reflects important
institutional values. Especially in the context of controversial
constitutional law cases, stare decisis upholds the ideal of a rule of
law and lessens the effect of personal value judgments of individ-
ual justices. Hence, absent the traditional bases of an "artful"
overruling, this article concluded that Payne was unwarranted.379
This section argues that the Court will overrule Payne. That
will be possible because of changes in court personnel and, per-
haps, because of the increased sensitivity to institutional values
demonstrated by Casey's plurality opinion.38 ° Unlike Payne's
treatment of Booth, 81 this section argues that by the time the
Court is ready to reexamine Payne, it will have a principled basis
upon which to overrule that decision on grounds in addition to
simple disagreement with the Court's reasoning and result.382
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id., at 2605-06.
377. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987).
378. See supra text accompanying notes 311-15.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 213-75.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 151-69.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 73-99.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 272-75.
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Payne suggested unconvincingly that Booth had proved
unworkable. 38 3 That argument is especially ironic when one
compares the potential confusion that flows from Payne's hold-
ing. This section reviews some of the confusion that will follow
Payne and discusses some of the questionable results that are
foreshadowed by the Court's decision. 84
Some states allow evidence not only about the emotional
impact of the offense, but also about the family members' view
about whether the death penalty should be imposed. 85 Payne
left open whether opinion evidence is consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.8 6
That question has already produced difficult litigation in
lower courts. Prior to Payne, the Tenth Circuit upheld a trial
court's refusal to allow relatives of a murder victim to testify
against the imposition of the death penalty.387 The court did so
on a number of grounds, including, most importantly, the argu-
ment that the evidence was irrelevant to the moral culpability of
the offender.388 The court reexamined the issue after the
Supreme Court handed down Payne.3 89
The Tenth Circuit affirmed its earlier decision, upholding
the judgment of sentence. It noted that the Supreme Court spe-
cifically reserved the question whether opinion evidence from
family members was admissible. It argued plausibly that the con-
tested evidence did not "relate to the harm caused by the
defendant."390
Robison demonstrates Payne's capacity to generate controver-
sial issues that the Supreme Court will have to resolve. And while
Robison's conclusion is defensible, 91 it suggests issues not so eas-
ily resolved after Payne. For example, Robison's counsel might
have attempted to introduce testimony that the execution of the
defendant would not ease the pain of family members, but would
383. See supra text accompanying notes 217-64.
384. See infra text accompanying notes 382-420.
385. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 960.001 (1)(e) (West Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-1530 (F) (Law. Co-op. 1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.69.010
(West Supp. 1990).
386. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
387. Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987).
388. Id. 1504-05.
389. Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 445 (1991).
390. Id. 1218.
391. Robison may be read narrowly as holding only that opinion evidence
- either that death or life is appropriate - is irrelevant. Opinion evidence
would appear unrelated to harm and so be inadmissible under Payne or to
culpability and so be inadmissible under Booth.
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increase their suffering. 92 If applied consistently, Payne would
make that evidence admissible in light of its express statement
that evidence "about the impact of the murder on the victim's
family is relevant to the jury's decision . . . ." Robison suggests
other possible cases. For example, one can imagine cases in
which a murder victim has abused his family and rather than
causing profound grief, the death has freed the family.3 94 If the
victim's family members were willing to admit that, Payne makes
that evidence admissible. But if imposition of the death penalty
turns on something as unpredictable as whether family members
are particularly forgiving or vengeful, Payne invites another ran-
dom or arbitrary basis upon which the death penalty may be
imposed.
395
Payne creates other anomalous results. For example, in the
state's case-in-chief, rules of evidence typically prevent a prosecu-
tor from putting into issue the character of the victim.3 96 Unless
the defendant puts in evidence relating to the victim's propensity
for violence, character evidence may be irrelevant.3 9 7 But even
when relevant, the rule making victim character evidence inad-
missible without more reflects courts' and legislatures' recogni-
tion that on balance, character evidence is too prejudicial.3 98
Further, a defendant cannot introduce evidence of the victim's
392. If as in Payne, the prosecutor may argue that the death penalty will
ease the victim's family's suffering because that is a measure of the harm caused
by the defendant, a defendant would almost certainly be allowed to argue the
reverse because that too would be related to the harm caused by the defendant.
393. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
394. Take, for example, the story of Diane, whose husband had beaten
her severely in the past and was molesting Diane's ten-year-old daughter. After
Diane's brother learned of the abuse, he and his friends took Diane's husband
for a car ride and bludgeoned him to death. "[Judges] do not understand that
by the time actual murder has occurred in a violent family, the surviving family
members may simply be so emotionally exhausted that all they are immediately
capable of feeling, or of expressing, is relief that the abuse and terror have
finally ceased." LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE: WHY BATrERED WOMEN
KILL AND How SOCIETy RESPONDS 160-61 (1989). Another example is the story
of Joyce Hawthorne. She and her children suffered 15 years of abuse at the
hands of her husband who molested their daughter, repeatedly beat Joyce,
night after night forced Joyce at gunpoint to have intercourse, and shot the
children's dog. This violence escalated until Joyce shot him 9 times. Id. at 16-
23. See also Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984) (abused son killed
father).
395. Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
396. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Cf Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469 (1948)
(allowing the defendant to put his character at issue, but not allowing the
prosecutor to do so until the defendant had opened the door).
397. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (2).
398. SeeJOHN W. STRONG, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 188 (1992).
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character unless he contends that he was aware of the relevant
propensity. 399 One of the legitimate fears in cases involving prov-
ocation, is that the victim will be put on trial and that the jury will
decide the case based on prejudice.4 °°
Payne rejects the traditional insight that victim character evi-
dence is too prejudicial to allow case by case balancing.40 1
Instead, Payne stated that Booth's per se rule was unnecessary but
recognized that in a given case, VIS may be "so unduly prejudi-
cial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, "402 in violation
of fourteenth amendment due process. Not surprisingly, post-
Payne litigants have raised due process challenges with some fre-
quency.40 3 Fundamental fairness, however, invites confusion.
Reliance on fundamental fairness as a measure of due process
has often invited criticism of the Court precisely because the test
is so vague and invites imposition of arbitrary subjective value
judgments of individual justices. °4 In the late 1930s through the
399. See DAVID W. LouISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 135 (1985).
400. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1010 (Brown, J., specially concurring) ("In his
defense, appellant employed the oldest, most common and most successful
tactic in homicide cases. He put the deceased on trial.").
401. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. (The Court states that the Eighth
Amendment erects no per se bar to admission of victim impact evidence, but
leaves it to the States' discretion whether or not to allow admission of victim
impact evidence.)
402. Id. at 2608.
403. See, e.g., People v. Stansbury, 4 Cal. 4th 1017 (1993) (defendant
raised due process claim when there was a relitigation during the penalty phase
of facts underlying defendant's prior convictions); People v. Raley, 2 Cal. 4th
870 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1352 (1993) (defendant argues that admission
of certain evidence violated his due process rights because the jury was
incapable of evaluating this evidence fairly, since this evidence had already
convicted him of murder); People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629 (1992) (defendant
raised a due process claim when the trial court refused to exclude certain
evidence).
404. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1951) ("What the
majority hold [sic] is that the Due Process Clause empowers this Court to nullify
any state law if its application 'shocks the conscience,' offends 'a sense of
justice,' or runs counter to the 'decencies of civilized conduct.' The majority
emphasize [sic] that these statements do not refer to their own consciences or to
their sense ofjustice and decency."); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89-90
(1946) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I fear to see the consequences of the Court's
practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for
the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of departure in interpreting and
enforcing the Bill of Rights .... To hold that this Court can determine what, if
any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is
to frustrate the great design of a written Constitution.... But this formula [of
naturalaw-due-process] also has been used in the past, and can be used in the
future, to license this Court, in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at
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mid-1960s, the Supreme Court relied on a similar test in assess-
ing due process voluntariness claims in confession cases.4 °5 The
confusion and lack of guidance offered to lower courts moved
the Court to adopt Miranda's prophylactic warnings.4"6 There is
no reason to think that a fundamental fairness "analysis" will fare
better in this context. Whatever confusion Booth caused will be
tame by comparison to Payne's invitation to examine VIS in light
of a fundamental fairness argument.
Other anomalies inhere in Payne's holding: most commen-
tators who have criticized Payne have pointed to the arbitrary and
unequal results that flow from Payne's holding.40 7 Despite the
large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to trespass, all too freely,
on the legislative domain of the States as well as the Federal Government."); Id.
at 177 ("I long ago concluded that the accordian-like qualities of this
philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty safeguards
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.")
405. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 805-06 (1970) (Brown v.
Mississippi held that defendant had been denied due process of law when he
was "strung up" to obtain his "voluntary" confession. "Admittedly, there was no
very obvious theoretical ground for this holding.... In 1936, it was far from
evident why the due process clause [sic] required anything more of state
criminal proceedings than a regular and fair trial, giving the defendant a
regular and fair opportunity to contest his guilt under state evidentiary rules
. " Amsterdam notes that the incorporation of the Fifth Amendment
(forbidding compulsory self-incrimination, applied only to federal criminal
proceedings) into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(requiring that state courts exclude evidence obtained unconstitutionally) were
products of a much later era. In addition, Amsterdam suggests that because the
whole "voluntary" confession procedure in Brown was so shocking, the Supreme
Court reversed convictions based on these issues, since such a conviction was
"revolting to the sense of justice." Id. at 806); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda
Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 168-69 (Decisions made after
Miranda "do not appear to rest upon any unifying, coherent principle other
than a fundamental rejection of the premises of Miranda and an apparent
desire to return, ultimately, to the 'voluntariness' standard. . . . From the
standpoint of candor and craftsmanship, however, the opinions, taken as a
whole, are highly unsatisfactory. In its unyielding determination to reach the
desired result, the Court has too often resorted to distortion of the record,
disregard of the precedents, and an unwillingness honestly to explain or to
justify its conclusions.").
406. See Miranda v, Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S.
890 (1966). For discussion of protective devices made available under Miranda,
see id. at 471-72.
407. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering- A Personal Reflection and a
Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FtA. ST. U. L. REv. 21 (1992) (Berger suggests that
because of Payne's holding, unexpressed biases, such as race, can and will be
expressed and exploited.); Markus D. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When
the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 Burr. L. REv. 85 (1993) (explaining that the "newly
created paradigm of Payne has discarded accuracy of capital sentencing and
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Court's insistence to the contrary,408 defendants are more likely
to be subject to the death penalty because of factors that are
unquestionably impermissible. For example, in ruling in McCles-
key v. Kemp that the death penalty is not unconstitutional despite
evidence that race of the victim and of the offender are factors in
its imposition, the Court insisted that basing a decision on race is
impermissible. °9 But juries will be invited to assess the status of
the victim;410 insofar as race also correlates with' wealth and
access to other social benefits,41 Payne will increase the skewing
already found in the Baldus study, demonstrating that the race of
the victim and the perpetrator did correlate with the imposition
of the death penalty.412
If taken at face value, Payne has opened up another new pro-
cedural nightmare for courts trying death penalty cases. Payne
holds, after all, that the character of the victim is relevant in
assessing the harm to society.41 The logical extension is that a
defendant, even without the prosecutor putting in issue the char-
acter of the victim, can introduce evidence (without regard to
provocation or self defense) about the bad character of the vic-
replaced it with uniformity, leading to the possibility of arbitrary capital
sentencing"); Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact
Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1621 (1992)
(proposing that the use of victim impact statements at capital sentencing will
lead to disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants); K. Elizabeth
Whitehead, Note, Mourning Becomes Electric: Payne v. Tennessee's Allowance of
Victim Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 45 ARu- L. REV. 531
(1992) (arguing that because the Payne Court failed to establish parameters for
admitting victim impact statements, courtrooms are not open to theatrics -
leading to arbitrary sentencing - rather than an individualized determination
of the defendant's fate).
408. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607 (Rehnquist argues that admitting victim
impact evidence will not lead to "comparative judgments" of victims based on
whether the jury finds them to be "assets to their community or not.").
409. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S 279, 299-300 & n.30 (1987).
410. See, e.g., David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics: Explaining Payne v.
Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 157, 175 n.78 (1992) (The author suggests that
a defendant may try to use the rule of Payne, and might want to suggest,
"probably by indirection, that the victim of his crime was vermin. Payne seems
to require that such a proffer be admissible.").
411. See, e.g., Census Says Minorities Trail Whites in Homeownership, L.A.
TIMES, June 22, 1993, at D2 (Census figures show that the median income of
black households was $18,807 in 1991, compared to $31,569 for white
households. The median income for Latinos was $22,691.).
412. DAVID C. BAtus ET AL., EQUALJUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALT. A
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
413. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991) (The Court states
that victim impact statements are designed to show each victim's "uniqueness as
an individual human being," whatever the jury might think the loss to the
community resulting from his death might be.).
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tim, again without any showing that the defendant considered
the victim's poor character.414 Faced with the death penalty, and
with the Court's view that harm to society is relevant in deciding
whether the defendant should die, a defendant ought to engage
in character assassination.41 5
Booth suggested that counsel will hesitate to challenge posi-
tive victim impact evidence.416 After Payne, one wonders whether
counsel has a choice. In addition, Booth's assumption that coun-
sel is hesitant to put a crime victim on trial is open to serious
question. For example, in rape prosecutions and in homicide
cases involving self defense and provocation, attorneys have not
been shy about placing victims on trial.417 In defending Bernard
Goetz, for example, Barry Slotnick cast the victims as a "gang of
four," "savages" and "predators."418 In cases involving provoca-
tion, counsel routinely put the victim on trial.419 In rape prose-
cutions, women routinely felt victimized a second time on cross
414. Compare Booth with Payne i.e., Booth required a showing that the
victim's character related to the circumstances of the crime that a defendant
knew of them. Payne rejects that.
415. See David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics: Explaining Payne v.
Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 157, 175 n.78 (1992) ("A defendant might
want to suggest, probably by indirection, that the victim of his crime was
vermin." Dow expresses dismay that the new rule handed down by Payne, if it is
retroactively applied, enables the "defendant (to] raise the new rule in collateral
proceedings.").
416. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987).
417. See Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(defense counsel probed victim regarding her past sexual conduct); State v.
Pace, 456 P.2d 197, 202-03 (N.M. 1969) (introducing by prosecution of
testimony as to the good character of the victim was admissible because defense
had testified that the deceased had made homosexual advances before the
killing, thereby opening the door to rebuttal); State v. Griffin, 529 P.2d 399, 404
(Or. Ct. App. 1974) ("A defendant claiming self-defense ought to be able to
present evidence of the violent character of deceased when intoxicated when
there is evidence supporting such a position.");Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991,
1010 (Wyo. 1984) (Brown, J., concurring) (The defendant was a boy who had
shot and killed his father. The cornerstone of his defense was that he and his
family had been brutalized by his father, and that the killing was carried out to
end this abuse. "Defense witnesses had a motive to make deceased look like a
bad man; they wanted to make the jury believe that appellant's father deserved
to be executed."); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1, 32 (1977) (because of defense counsel's
propensity to attack the chastity of rape victims, states have enacted rape shield
laws which have curbed the use of evidence respecting the rape victim's sexual
history).
418. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 102 (1988).
419. See, e.g., WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE GARLAND 206-07
(1982) (The defendant killed his girlfriend with a hammer. Of the trial,
defense counsel stated, "It was important to taint a little bit.")
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examination, at least part of the motivation for wide adoption of
Rape Shield laws.4 20 That is, defense attorneys know how to sully
the victim.
Payne invites prosecutors to offer glowing accounts of homi-
cide victims. The logical way in which to rebut that evidence is to
attempt to demonstrate that the victim was not a worthy person.
Many commentators have argued that the victim is not given a
voice in the criminal trial, that no one speaks for the victim.4 2 1
In part, the capitulation to victims' rights advocates explains the
result in Payne.4 22 But the cost of that victory is that the victim
will be on trial at the sentencing phase if the accused hopes to
rebut the glowing portrayal offered by the state.
Payne has the potential to create confusion because of its
invitation to challenge VIS on a case by case basis. 423 It may exac-
erbate the unequal distribution of the imposition of the death
penalty along racial and economic grounds. It implicitly invites
defense counsel to engage in character assassination of the dece-
dent, contrary to the original hopes of victims' rights groups.
Those issues will invite the Court to begin eroding Paynes foun-
dation almost immediately.
Once Payne has been weakened by its own incoherence, the
Court will have the opportunity to revisit whether Payne or Booth
was an aberration, an unwarranted departure from a consistent
line of precedent.424 As argued earlier, Booth was consistent with
the general premises of the criminal law.4 25 Harm matters, but
420. Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 32 (1977).
421. See generally Symposium, Perspectives on Proposals for a Constitutional
Amendment Providing Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, 34 WAYNE L.
REv. 1 (1987); Symposium, Victims' Rights, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (1984).
422. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2627 & n.1 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("In his concurring opinion today [see ante at 2613],Justice Scalia
again relies on the popular opinion that has 'found voice in a nationwide
"victim's rights" movement.' "); David R. Dow, When Law Bows to Politics:
Explaining Payne v. Tennessee, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 157, 169 (1992) (noting
how Scalia has succumbed to political concerns - especially the victim rights
movement).
423. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991).
424. Cf Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The 'Art' of Overruling,
1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 222-23 ("[T]he result of applying a particular doctrine
has been exactly the opposite of that intended by the earlier Court and that the
achievement of this original objective can in fact be accomplished only through
reversal of the original decision itself.") (citing Fay v. Noir, 372 U.S. 391, 437
(1963) (non-Constitutional overruling)); Id. at 224-25 (discussing erosion).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 310-74.
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not as an independent condition; harm relates to desert when an
offender is aware of or intends the harm.426
Further, assessing whether Payne or Booth was aberrational
will require reexamination of the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence. No commentator would be willing to argue that
the Supreme Court's death penalty case law runs a smooth and
consistent course.427 But the Court has developed important
themes4 28 in its different lines of precedent. As discussed below,
Booth followed directly from one important line of precedent.4 29
In Furman v. Georgia, the Court appeared concerned primar-
ily with the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.4"' As stated
in a later plurality opinion, the Court is concerned when there is
426. See, e.g., Markus D. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe is
Ready to Strike, 41 Burr. L. Rv. 85, 132 (1993) ("According to the standard
retributive theory underlying the Court's capital jurisprudence, retributive
desert falls into two components: moral culpability and harm."); R.P.
Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retributivism and Capital Punishment: A Philosophical
Critique of Payne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 25, 71 (1992) (arguing that
"fixing punishment in accordance with the harm caused is not objectionable
where the actor possesses the requisite mens rea with respect to that harm").
427. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
67, 81 (1992) (Gey describes the tension between the Court's two irreconcilable
objectives in sentencing: that is the elimination of discretion while preserving
individualized sentencing. In each successive case, the Court has veered to one
side or the other. Because of these different approaches, Gey laments, "[I]t is
futile even to pretend that the system can work fairly or systematically." (Id. at
132)).
428. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
67, 81 (1992) (Two important, but inconsistently applied objectives of the
Court in its capital punishment decisions have been the elimination of
discretion in capital sentencing and the preservation of individualized
sentencing in death penalty cases. A third objective has been the use of
aggravating circumstances, the treatment of which "has been guided by the goal
of eliminating discretion and thereby [theoretically] eliminating arbitrariness."
(Id. at 87)).
429. See infra text accompanying notes 433-35.
430. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("We have, I fear, taken in practice the same position [where
punishment increased in severity as social status diminished] partially as a result
of making the death penalty discretionary."); id. at 274, 277 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e are aided.., by a second principle inherent in the [Cruel
and Unusual Punishments] Clause - that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a
severe punishment .... The more significant function of the Clause, therefore,
is to protect against the danger of their arbitrary infliction."); id. at 310
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed."); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Capital punishment is
imposed discriminatorily against certain identifiable classes of people.").
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"no principled way to distinguish [cases] in which the death pen-
alty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not."43'
Without always acknowledging the potential inconsistency,
the Court has also held that a state must allow a defendant wide
latitude in introducing mitigating evidence during the sentenc-
ing phase.4" 2 Those cases, in effect, gave rise to the problem as
seen by the Payne majority. Counsel will typically marshall evi-
dence of difficult conditions surrounding the defendant's child-
hood and of any kindness shown by the defendant.433 The
evidence is allowed to show that the defendant is a "uniquely
individual human being."
43 4
The perceived inconsistency between those two lines of cases
is that focusing on unique characteristics of the defendant seems
to invite arbitrariness. For example, a statute that makes the
death penalty mandatory for anyone convicted of murder would
avoid the concern about its imposition being unpredictable.
One would know, unless juries arbitrarily refused to find a
defendant guilty of murder, in advance whether the death pen-
alty would be imposed. But in such a system, there would be no
room for evidence of the defendant's uniqueness.43 5
431. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion).
432. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) ("evidence
about the defendant's background and character is relevant") (quoting
California v. Brown 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor J., concurring));
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983) ("[T)he rules of evidence generally
extant at the federal and state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged
evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder . .. .);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (stating that the State
cannot preclude the sentencer from considering any relevant mitigating
evidence that the defendant "proffers" in support of a sentence less than
death); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("[Iln capital
cases, the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.").
433. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2602 (1991) (evidence
that Payne was a very caring person who did not use drugs or drink, that he was
mentally handicapped, and that he was "the most polite prisoner" offered in
mitigation); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (evidence of turbulent
family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of serious emotional
disturbance offered in mitigation).
434. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
435. See Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the
Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REv. 493, 517 (1992)
(noting that the statute involved in Woodson for a mandatory death sentence
"would accord the least consideration to the individual circumstances of the
defendant").
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Revisiting Payne would allow the Court an opportunity to
clarify the law and to deal with apparent inconsistencies within its
death penalty case law. In fact, the Court may be able to explain
both its concern about equality of treatment, that is, avoiding
arbitrariness, and about the uniqueness of the individual. In a
number of post-Furman cases and in Booth, the Court imposed
substantive limitations on the imposition of the death penalty.
Initially, an offender's conduct had to result in a death - that is,
sufficient harm had to result.436 But once a death has occurred,
the death penalty must be reserved for the most culpable offend-
ers based on the principle of proportionality. For example, in
Enmund v. Florida, the Court found that a defendant could not be
put to death if he "does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend
that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. 437
The principle of proportionality focuses most importantly on the
offender's moral culpability.4"'
The Court has never fully developed its view of the moral
justification for the imposition of the death penalty.439 But cases
like Enmund and Coker v. Georgia strongly suggest that the Court
rejects a utilitarian deterrence rationale and, along with prevail-
ing philosophical discussions of punishment, believes that the
death penalty is justified based on the offender's just deserts. 440
In the scenario that I have posed whereby the Court reexamines
Payne, the Court would have the opportunity to clarify the philo-
sophical justification (s) for the death penalty. The Court would
436. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(determining that imposing the death penalty in a case of rape is in violation of
the Eighth Amendment even if surrounded by aggravating circumstances).
437. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
438. See R.P. Peerenboom, Victim Harm, Retributivism and Capital
Punishment: A Philosophical Critique ofPayne v. Tennessee, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 25, 39
(1992) (Professor Peerenboom points out that if capital punishment
jurisprudence propounds to impose the death penalty based upon "rational
criteria" and proportionate to the offense, then if victim impact statements are
morally irrelevant to culpability, it can hardly provide a rational and
proportionate basis for capital punishment. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp 481
U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987)).
439. See Steve G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Riv.
67, 103-04 (1992) ("Starting with Gregg and the other 1976 cases, the justices
focused their attention almost exclusively on the minutiae of capital sentencing
while ignoring the larger issues of constitutional justification for the death
penalty.").
440. Id. at 112-13. The author argues that the Court has rejected the
utilitarian deterrence rationale for applying the death penalty, because the
Court could not justify imposing it as punishment for crimes other than those
involving the "unjustified taking of human life" (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 598 (1977)) Id.
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be justified in limiting the death penalty by reference to an
offender's just deserts.441
Insofar as the Court adopts the view that the death penalty is
reserved for the most culpable offenders, the two lines of cases,
one limiting its arbitrary imposition and two requiring guided
discretion and admission into evidence of mitigating circum-
stances, can be lined up. Whether a decision is arbitrary or une-
qual cannot be resolved until one knows the relevant criteria
upon which to judge rationality or equality.44 A mandatory
death sentence would be arbitrary and might result in unequal
treatment because offenders whose moral culpability might read-
ily be distinguished would be treated in the same way. Sentenc-
ing to death a person who carries out a loved one's wishes and is
guilty of mercy killing and a mass murderer who tortured his vic-
tims would not be equal treatment if moral blame is the relevant
standard.
Clarifying that just deserts is the underlying moral justifica-
tion for the death penalty would allow the Court to make coher-
ent two lines of precedent. A third line of precedent would still
need to be addressed. The Court has upheld various state stat-
utes that allow the imposition of the death penalty based on the
state's showing of aggravating circumstances. 443  In some
instances, aggravating circumstances relate to the offender's cul-
pability. An offender who tortures his victim or otherwise com-
mits a murder in a cruel manner demonstrates a kind of
441. At this late date, and given explicit reference to capital punishment,
for example, in the Fifth Amendment, one cannot seriously contend that the
Court will abrogate the death penalty. Instead, it will seek rational limitations
on its imposition. Basing death eligibility on the actor's just deserts is morally
defensible. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
67, 118 (1992) (arguing that a retributivist could justify the death penalty along
lines of just desert).
442. See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1011,
1051-53 (1991) (determining the equality of punishment makes sense only
when we know the relevant criteria).
443. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985) (finding
requirement that a jury convicting defendant of any one of a number of
specified aggravated crimes "return a 'sentence' of death along with its guilty
verdict did not render unconstitutional the death sentence trial judge imposed
after independently considering defendant's background and character, and
circumstances of the crime"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) ("limited
function served byjury's finding of statutory aggravating circumstance [in which
at least one valid aggravating circumstance must be found] does not render
statutory scheme invalid"); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (statute
prohibited infliction of death penalty except for certain relatively aggravated
crimes).
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viciousness that increases his culpability. 44' But predictions of
future dangerousness do not relate to the offender's culpabil-
ity. 445 The offender who kills quickly even before allowing his
victim to become aware of the impending death nonetheless may
be so psychopathic to represent a continuing threat.
That line of cases, especially in light of grave doubts about
the accuracy of such predictions446 and available security meas-
ures that may reduce future dangerousness, 4 7 might be reexam-
ined by the Court. If the Court were to articulate a clear
justification for the death penalty, it might have to overturn
those cases that allow factors unrelated to the offender's culpabil-
ity. Limiting the death sentence to the most culpable offenders
would undercut Payne's central premise, that harm without refer-
ence to blame is relevant to punishment.
The critical point though in terms of Booth is this: a domi-
nant theme in the Court's death penalty case law has focused on
the core question of an offender's culpability. 448 Insofar as the
death penalty is available, it should single out the most heinous
offenders - guided discretion that does so is not arbitrary.449
The result in Booth flowed naturally from that line of precedent.
444. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 6 (1980) (The Model Penal Code
recognizes that the "style of killing [is] indicative of utter depravity that
imposition of the ultimate sanction should be considered.").
445. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
67, 118 (1992) ("A retributivist justifies punishment only as a response to a
defendant's past immoral conduct. Whether the defendant is likely to do harm
to unknown people in the future is irrelevant to a retributivist's determination
of the defendant's just deserts.").
446. See Henry J, Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1084, 1098
(1976) (demonstrating the inaccuracy of future predictions by showing an 86%
error rate).
But see Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 67,
118 n.216 (1992) (However, in Texas, Dr. Grigson, AKA "Dr. Death," is known
"for his highly effective testimony that defendants he never met are sociopaths
who will certainly commit future acts of criminal violence if permitted to live.").
447. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
67, 118-19 (1992) (available security measure which may reduce future
dangerousness includes permanent incapacitation).
448. See Peerenboom, supra note 435.
449. See Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the
Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REv. 493, 516 (1992).
The author suggests that the Gregg statute (which called for the presentation of
any ten statutory aggravating circumstances or any mitigating circumstances at
the penalty phase; the sentencer has the discretion not to impose the death
penalty even if aggravating circumstances are found) is acceptable because it
"provides for an individualized consideration of the defendant." Id.
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If an offender is unaware of the harm caused by his conduct, the
harm is irrelevant to the key question of culpability.
V. CONCLUSION
Payne represents a benchmark of the activism of the Rehn-
quist Court. The Court reached out to decide a constitutional
question not pursued by the litigants.45 The Court did not
make a plausible case for overruling recent precedent.4 51 Chief
Justice Rehnquist treated stare decisis as a matter of convenience,
rather than priciple, and suggested, somewhat misleadingly,45
that the "Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent" if
the previous decision was badly reasoned or proved
unworkable.453
Payne ignored the significant institutional values reflected in
the doctrine of stare decisis.454 Ironically, justices in the Payne
majority were appointed with fanfare and promises that they
would not substitute their own value preferences in deciding
cases. But stare decisis, the doctrine treated so cavalierly in
Payne, does restrain judges from imposing their own value prefer-
ences.455 Payne was a victory for its majority at the expense of the
rule of law.456
Despite Payne's statement that the Court has not been con-
strained by stare decisis in certain cases, the Court has tradition-
ally developed an "art" of overruling precedent. It has looked to
changed circumstances, the lessons of experience, and erosion of
earlier precedent tojustify decisions to overrule precedent.457 As
this article demonstrates, Payne made no such case against Booth
and indeed could not, given its recent vintage. At most, Payne
demonstrated that its new majority disagreed with the result in
Booth, hardly a principled or sufficient reason to overrule recent
precedent.458 That is especially true in light of what this article
has argued: Payne's emphasis on the role of harm in the criminal
law is at odds with the bulk of criminal law doctrine, both the
insistence of culpability (mens rea) necessary to define criminal-
450. See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. PEv.
67, 70 n.14 (1992).
451. See supra text accompanying notes 192-275.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 107-18.
453. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (quoting Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
454. See supra text accompanying notes 119-35.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 136-49.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 119-35, 170-90.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 170-90.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 191-275.
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ity in the first instance and the relevance of culpability in deter-
mining an offender's sentence. Seldom is harm without more
sufficient to justify punishment or criminalizing the underlying
conduct.45
9
This article argued that a new majority will be able to over-
rule Payne in a principled manner. Payne contains the source of
its own unravelling; it invites results that are almost universally
deemed unacceptable.46 Putting the decedent on trial will
make all but the most callous balk. Payne invites litigation that
will lead to its erosion. Consistent with traditional criteria for
overruling precedent, the Court will have to reexamine Payne
and will bring the use of VIS back in line with traditional con-
cepts of the criminal law46' and will allow their use only consis-
tent with notions of the offender's just desert. 462
459. See supra text accompanying notes 290-375.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 388-419.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 296-375.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 424-46.
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